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ABSTRACT 
On December 27, 2008, Israel began a military campaign 
codenamed Operation Cast Lead with an aerial bombardment of the 
Gaza Strip. On January 3, 2009, Israel expanded its aerial assault 
with a ground invasion. Military operations continued until January 
18, 2009, when Israel implemented a unilateral cease fire and 
withdrew its forces. When the hostilities had ended, between 1,166 and 
1,440 Palestinians had been killed as a result of Israeli attacks, two-
thirds of whom are estimated to be civilians. Ensuing allegations of 
international human rights (IHR) and international humanitarian law 
(IHL) violations were widespread.  
Amidst these claims, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) commissioned a fact-finding team, headed by South African 
jurist Richard Goldstone, to investigate whether the laws of war were 
infringed upon. Their findings, published in a document known 
colloquially as the Goldstone Report, allege a number of breaches of 
the laws of occupation, yet give a cursory treatment to the preliminary 
question of the applicability of this legal regime. This paper seeks to 
more comprehensively assess whether Gaza could be considered 
occupied territory for the purposes of international humanitarian law 
during Operation Cast Lead. In doing so, this paper focuses on exactly 
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what triggers and terminates the laws of occupation‘s application, 
rather than the rights and duties derived from the laws of occupation.  
This paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the history of the 
Gaza occupation, including Israel‘s unilateral evacuation of ground 
troops and settlements from within Gaza in 2005, a historic event that 
sparked renewed debate over Israel‘s status as an Occupying Power 
vis-à-vis Gaza. The following section traces the development of the 
laws of occupation in instruments of IHL. The next section considers 
the relevant international case law on occupation. The following 
section synthesizes the various criteria from the IHL treaty and case 
law for determining the existence of a situation of occupation, and 
considers their application to the Gaza Strip during Operation Cast 
Lead. The concluding section argues that Israel maintained the status 
of Occupying Power during Operation Cast Lead, and discusses the 
legal implications of such a determination.  
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Background 
The Gaza Strip fell under British occupation and military 
administration following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, 
during the First World War. 1 British rule over the Gaza Strip was 
formalized in June 1922 under the League of Nations Mandate system, 
which dismembered the newly defunct Ottoman territories and 
conferred their control to various Allied powers. 2 British control of the 
Gaza Strip continued until 1947, when the British declared they were 
resigning from the Mandate and handing the matter over to the United 
Nations. The General Assembly held lengthy deliberations, and on 
November 29, 1947, passed Resolution 181 (II), which would partition 
Mandatory Palestine into a Jewish State and a Palestinian Arab State. 
3 
                                                          
1 Charles Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Bedford: St. 
Martin‘s, 2001), pp. 106-107 
 
2 Palestine Royal Commission Report Presented by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July 
1937, Cmd. 5479. His Majesty‘s Stationery Office., London, 1937, 
available at: 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/88A6BF6F1BD82405852574CD
006C457F 
 
3 General Assembly Res. 181 (II), UN GAOR 2nd Session, UN Doc. 
A/310 (1947) 
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The first Arab-Israeli war immediately followed the partition, 
lasting from December 1947 to July 1949. During the course of the 
war, Israeli forces commandeered a further twenty-two percent of 
Mandatory Palestine than would have been allotted in the United 
Nations partition plan. 4 The remaining territories - the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip - were allotted to Jordanian and Egyptian 
administration, respectively. 5  Egyptian administration of the Gaza 
Strip continued until the Six Day War in July of 1967, when Israel 
seized control of the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank, Golan Heights 
and Sinai Peninsula) and established a military government there. 6  
Following the 1967 war, Israel maintained that because it had 
not displaced a recognized sovereign Palestinian state in taking control 
of the Gaza Strip, that the territory was ―administered‖ by Israel, but 
not ―occupied‖ within the scope of international law. 7 However, that 
                                                          
4 Sami Hadawi, Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A 
Comprehensive Study (London: Saqi Books, 1988), pp. 81. 
 
5 Ibid 1, at pp. 203 
 
6 Meir Shamgar, ―Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military 
Government Military Government in the Territories Administered by 
Israel,‖ Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1982): pp. 13 
 
7 This argument has been referred to by legal scholars as the ―missing 
reversioner thesis.‖ It was expounded in a number of legal articles 
published in Israel and the United States in the 1970s . See Yehuda 
Blum, ―The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea 
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position was rejected by most authorities. 8 Indeed, Israel‘s presence in 
the Gaza Strip was seen internationally as that of an Occupying 
Power, triggering the rules of international law pertinent to situations 
of belligerent occupation. This view has been reiterated by the 
International Court of Justice, 9 the Oslo Accords, 10 the Israeli 
Supreme Court, 11 the UN Security Council, 12 the UN General 
Assembly 13 and the U.S. State Department. 14 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Samaria,‖ Israel Law Review (1968): pp. 279; Meir Shamgar, ―The 
Observance of International Law in the Occupied Territories,‖ Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights (1971): pp. 262  
 
8 The ―missing reversioner thesis‖ was expressly rejected by the 
International Court of Justice in the Wall Advisory opinion. See Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 166 (July 9) 
 
9 Ibid  
 
10 Palestinian Liberation Organization – Negotiation Affairs 
Department, ―The Israeli ‗Disengagement‘ Plan: Gaza Still Occupied,‖ 
(2005) [citing Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities 
(Aug. 9, 1994), Art. XIII, §§ 4-5] 
 
11 Ayub, et al. v. Minister of Defense, et al, 606 Il. H.C. 78; Adjuri v. 
IDF Commander, 7015 Il. H.C. 02, 7019 Il. H.C. 02 (2002); and 2056 Il. 
H.C. 04 (2004)) 
 
12 S.C. Res. 1544, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1544 (May 19, 2004), 
 
13 G.A. Res. 58/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/292 (May 17, 2004) 
 
14 U.S. Department of State, ―Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices: Israel and the Occupied Territories,‖ (Feb. 25, 2004), 
available at: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm 
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However, Israel‘s status as an occupying power became less 
certain in 2005, when Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew 
its forces from its permanent military bases inside Gaza. In the 
aftermath of the withdrawal, the question of the legal status of the 
Gaza Strip as occupied territory became the subject of renewed debate. 
Israel maintained that its ―withdrawal‖ from Gaza should end any 
charge of a continuation of its then thirty-eight year occupation of the 
territory. 15  
That debate was further fueled by a series of developments in 
Gaza over the next two years. In January of 2006, less than a year 
after Israel‘s ―disengagement‖ Gaza, Hamas claimed seventy-six of the 
132 parliamentary seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council 
elections, giving the party the right to form the next cabinet under the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
15 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―The Disengagement Plan – 
General Outline,‖ (Apr. 18, 2004), available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Dise
ngagement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm 
 ―Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing 
Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. 
This will not include military deployment in the area of the 
border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt ("the Philadelphi 
Route") as detailed below.  Upon completion of this process, 
there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli 
security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip 
territory which have been evacuated. As a result, there will be 
no basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.‖ 
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Palestinian Authority‘s president, Mahmoud Abbas. 16 The United 
States, European Union and Israel immediately imposed severe 
economic sanctions on the Palestinian territories. 17 They demanded 
that Hamas recognize the state of Israel, renounce the use of violence 
and honor previous Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements. 18 The 
sanctions included an Israeli freeze of $700 million in tax revenue 
payments to the Palestinian Authority, and a tightening of restrictions 
on movement of people and goods within, into, and out of the Gaza 
Strip. 19 20  The Palestinian Authority, which relies heavily on 
international aid for day-to-day administration of the Occupied 
                                                          
16Who are Hamas?, BBC News, January 4, 2009, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1654510.stm 
 
17 Ibid  
 
18 Al Jazeera English, Hamas: Profile of the Palestinian Political 
Movement, available at: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/08/200982775839489
403.html 
 
19 Heller, Jeffery, Israel frees funds for Abbas; Hamas calls it bribery, 
Reuters, June 24, 2007, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/24/idUSL24549103 
 
20 BBC News, Hamas dismisses Israeli sanctions, February 20, 2006, 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4731058.stm 
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Palestinian Territories, soon fell into a severe financial crisis as a 
result of the economic sanctions. 21  
It was at this time that political tensions between Hamas and rival 
party Fatah began to simmer. By June 2007, Hamas and Fatah fought 
one another in armed skirmishes in the streets of the West Bank and 
Gaza for control of the territories. 22 In early 2007, the two parties 
agreed to form a unity government in a bid to reclaim international 
aid, taking office on March 17, 2007. 23 However, the fragile coalition 
succumbed to fissures and in June of 2007, Hamas forcibly seized 
                                                          
21 Ibid 18 
 
22 Ibid 18 
 
23 World Bank, ―West Bank and Gaza Country Brief,‖ (2008), available 
at: http://go.worldbank.org/Q8OGMLXI40 
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control of the Gaza Strip. 24 Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of the 
Fatah party cemented his control of the West Bank in response. 25  
With Hamas establishing themselves as the sole ruling party in the 
Gaza Strip, Israel moved to further isolate the group, tightening 
economic sanctions, cutting off electric power to the area and 
launching military strikes inside Gaza. 26 Additionally, the Israeli 
government issued a declaration on September 19, 2007 stating that 
Gaza had become a ―hostile territory‖ under the control of Hamas. 27 
Nonetheless, in early 2008, Hamas and Israel arrived at an informal 
                                                          
24 Some reports indicate Hamas‘ Gaza coup d‘état was actually a pre-
emption of a feared Fatah coup. See David Rose, The Gaza Bombshell, 
Vanity Fair, Apr. 8, 2008, available at: 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804 
―Wurmser accuses the Bush administration of ―engaging in a 
dirty war in an effort to provide a corrupt dictatorship [led by 
Abbas] with victory.‖ He believes that Hamas had no intention 
of taking Gaza until Fatah forced its hand. ―It looks to me that 
what happened wasn‘t so much a coup by Hamas but an 
attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could 
happen,‖ Wurmser says.‖ 
 
25 Ibid 18 
 
26 BBC News, Details of Gaza blockade revealed in court case, May 3, 
2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8654337.stm 
 
27 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, ―Security Cabinet 
Declares Gaza Hostile Territory,‖ September 19, 2007, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2007/Security+
Cabinet+declares+Gaza+hostile+territory+19-Sep-2007.htm 
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truce agreement, which came into effect on June 19, 2008. 28 The truce 
lasted from June 2008 to early November of that same year, and 
brought substantial calm to Southern Israel and the Gaza Strip. 29 
Israel has repeatedly claimed that Operation Cast Lead was the 
result of Hamas‘ violation of the terms of the truce, which called for an 
end to rocket attacks emanating from Gaza into Southern Israel. 30 
                                                          
28 Isabel Kershner, ―Israel Agrees to Truce with Hamas on Gaza,‖ The 
New York Times, June 18, 2008, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/world/middleeast/18mideast.html?
_r=3&fta=y 
 
29 See Kanwisher, N., Haushofer, J. & Biletzki, A., ―Reigniting 
Violence: How Do Ceasefires End?,‖  The Huffington Post, Jan. 6, 2009, 
available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancykanwisher/reigniting-violence-
how-d_b_155611.html 
―The ceasefire was remarkably effective: after it began in June 
2008, the rate of rocket and mortar fire from Gaza dropped to 
almost zero, and stayed there for four straight months.‖ 
 
30 See Tzipi Livni, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs, ―Briefing in 
Sderot – Opening Remarks,‖ Dec.28, 2008, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/
2008/FM_Livni_briefing_Sderot_Opening_remarks_28-Dec-2008.htm 
―Just to remind you, the calm that was achieved through the 
initiative of the Egyptians six months ago worked for a few 
weeks, and then Hamas deliberately violated this truce by 
targeting Israel on a daily basis, by smuggling weapons into the 
Gaza Strip, by continuing to keep Gilad Shalit in captivity and 
refusing to accelerate the negotiations to release him, by not 
coming to Cairo in order to do so - because they had this feeling 
that the Israelis are going to do nothing, and that the Arab 
world is going to do nothing and, at the end of the day the 
international community will put pressure on Israel. I hope that 
they are mistaken. This is something that we need to prove to 
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Indeed, rockets attacks from the Gaza Strip increased in the weeks 
preceding Operation Cast Lead‘s commencement on December 27. 31 
However, one finds that the escalation in rocket fire only occurred after 
an Israeli operation on November 4 which killed six Palestinian 
militants inside Gaza. 32 Prior to this operation, rocket attacks from 
Gaza had nearly ceased entirely, toting up to one a month in July, 
September and October and eight in the month of August. 33 In the 
words of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the 
Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, Hamas was 
―careful to maintain the ceasefire,‖ and ―tried to enforce the terms of 
the arrangement on the other terrorist organizations to prevent them 
from violating it.‖ 34  
                                                                                                                                                              
them during these days.  And Israel has paid the price for its 
restraint.‖ 
 
31 Ibid 29, at Figure 1 
 
32 Omar Sinan, ―Hamas Fires Rockets at Israel After Airstrike,‖ The 
Washington Post, Nov. 5, 2008, at A10 
 
33 Ibid 29 
 
34 Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, ―The Six 
Months of the Lull Arrangement,‖ December, 2008, available at: 
http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e017.pdf 
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Even so, on November 4, Israel went forward with the Gaza raid, 
killing six Palestinian militants inside Gaza and bringing to an end a 
four-month period of calm. In reprisal, Hamas resumed rocket attacks, 
launching 126 in November and 98 in December. 35 On December 19, 
the truce between Israel and Hamas formally expired, with Hamas 
leaders offering to consider renewing the truce if Israel lifted its 
blockade of the Gaza Strip, which had been in effect for 18 months 
prior. 36 
Eight days later, on December 27, 2008, Israel‘s UN Ambassador 
sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, stating 
―after a long period of utmost restraint, the government of Israel has 
decided to exercise, as of this morning, its right to self-defense.‖ That 
morning, Israel launched a military offensive in the Gaza Strip by air, 
inflicting massive damage on Gaza‘s already dilapidated 
                                                          
35 Israeli Intelligence and Information Center, ―Intensive rocket fire 
attacks against the western Negev population,‖ Dec. 21, 2008, pp. 6, 
available at:   
http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e018.pdf 
 
36 ―Hamas ‗May Extend‘ Truce if Israel Ends Siege, Stops Attacks,‖ The 
Daily Star, Dec. 24, 2008, available at: 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&arti
cle_id=98679 
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infrastructure, thereby initiating Operation Cast Lead. 37 At a second 
stage, Israeli ground troops entered into the Gaza Strip and some even 
penetrated as far as Gaza City. 38 The operation continued until Israel 
implemented a unilateral ceasefire on January 18, 2009. 39 
Since the end of the Operation Cast Lead, a number of commissions 
of inquiry have traveled to Gaza to assess whether the laws of war 
were infringed upon. Many of these inquiries have alleged breaches of 
the laws of occupation, while giving a cursory treatment to the 
preliminary question of the applicability of this legal regime. This 
article will not assess the conduct of Operation Cast Lead, as this 
question was examined at length in the Arab League report, the 
Goldstone report and by various human rights organizations. Rather, 
this paper seeks to answer the question of whether Gaza could be 
                                                          
37 Taghreed el-Khodary and Isabel Kershner, ―Israeli attack kills 
scores across Gaza,‖ The New York Times, December 27, 2008, 
available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/world/middleeast/web28mideast.ht
ml 
 
38 Ethan Bronner, ―Israeli ground invasion cuts Gaza in two,‖ The New 
York Times, January 4, 2009, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/world/africa/04iht-
gaza.4.19076000.html 
 
39 Joshua Mitnick, ―Israel agrees to unilateral Gaza cease-fire; Vows to 
defend itself,‖ The Washington Times, January 18, 2009, available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/18/israel-agrees-to-
unilateral-gaza-cease-fire/ 
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considered occupied territory for the purposes of international 
humanitarian law during Operation Cast Lead, as this question is 
critical to deciphering the legal regime applicable to Gaza, Israel‘s 
obligations under international law towards Gaza‘s inhabitants, and is 
of substantial relevance in any proceedings seeking to enforce 
humanitarian law by addressing alleged war crimes entailed in 
Operation Cast Lead through international criminal law.   
International Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law (IHL) is ―a set of rules, which 
seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict.‖ 
40Also known as the laws of war, IHL‘s historical roots can be traced to 
the rules of ancient civilizations and religions. In fact, it is one of the 
oldest codified branches of international law, with universal 
codification dating back to the 19th century. 41 
Ever since, States have agreed to a set of rules in order to 
―protect persons who are not or are no longer participating in the 
                                                          
40 International Committee of the Red Cross, ―Legal Fact Sheet: What 
is International Humanitarian Law?,‖ July 31, 2004, available at:  
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-
sheet/humanitarian-law-factsheet.htm? 
 
41 Ibid  
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hostilities and restrict the means and methods of warfare.‖ 42 As 
Christopher Greenwood put it, these rules strike ―a compromise 
between military and humanitarian requirements. [They] comply with 
both military necessity and the dictates of humanity.‖ 43 Accordingly, 
the various rules and obligations of IHL on States are only triggered in 
the context of armed conflict.  
Armed Conflict 
The generally accepted test for determining the existence of 
armed conflict was stated in Prosecutor v. Tadić. 44 In the Tadić 
decision, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) Appeals Chamber defined the contours of ―armed conflict,‖ 
holding that:  
―An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such conflicts 
                                                          
42 Ibid  
 
43 Christopher Greenwood, The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law Vol. 1 (UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 37. 
 
44 See Kevin Sullivan's Interview with University College London 
Lecturer and International Law Specialist Douglas Guilfoyle, available 
at: 
http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2010/06/what_is_hamas_ctd.html 
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and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general 
conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal armed 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, 
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole 
territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, 
whether or not actual combat takes place there.‖ 45  
The jurisprudence of the ICTY in the Tadić case represents an 
important contribution to the definition of ―armed conflict‖ in IHL. Not 
only did the Tribunal uphold that armed conflict must be initiated to 
trigger the application of IHL, but that IHL‘s application can continue 
well beyond the cessation of hostilities.  
The Laws of Occupation 
 While the initiation of armed conflict suffices to trigger IHL‘s 
application, an additional series of laws dealing specifically with 
situations of belligerent occupation are triggered may also apply. The 
rules of this body of law are found primarily in two treaties: the 
Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 46 and in 
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Protection of 
                                                          
45 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) ICTY-9-1-AR72 (2 
October 1995) paragraph 70 
 
46 Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907 
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Civilian Persons in Time of War. 47 Article 42 of the Hague Regulations 
provides some basic direction for the set of conditions required to 
trigger the laws of occupation. It states that: 
―Territory is considered to be occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies 
only to the territories where such authority is established, and 
can be exercised.‖ 48 
 The description of a territory as occupied derives from the 
principle that sovereign territory cannot be annexed through the use of 
force. Accordingly, any territory that has fallen under the control of a 
belligerent is deemed as occupied territory until a post-war agreement 
determines its status. 49  
Under the laws of occupation, an Occupying Power‘s activities 
are regulated to guarantee the protection of the rights of the local 
population of the territory. 50 These rules seek to regulate the 
Occupying Power‘s behavior in order to ensure that life in the occupied 
                                                          
47 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, adopted August 12,1948, entered into force October 21, 
1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
 
48 Ibid 46, at Article 42 
 
49 J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, 8th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1977), pp. 597-598 
 
50 Shane Darcy, ―In the Name of Security: IDF Measures and The Laws 
of Occupation,‖ Middle East Policy Vol. 10 (November 26, 2003): pp. 58 
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territory persists as unaffected as possible, stemming from the fact 
that the occupation has displaced the preceding government. 51 Article 
43 of the Hague Regulations, as the foundation of these rules, 
commands the occupying power ―take all the measures in his power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.‖  52  
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations also demands the Occupying 
Power respect, ―unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.‖ 53 Article 44 of the Hague Regulations prohibits ―any 
compulsion on the population of the occupied territory to take part in 
military operations against its own country.‖ 54 The Geneva 
Convention contains a similar article, Article 51, which expressly 
prohibits forcing the occupied population to serve in the military of the 
occupying power. 55 In addition, Article 46 of the Hague Regulations 
calls on the occupying power to respect ―family honor and rights, the 
lives of individuals and private property, as well as religious 
                                                          
51 Ibid 46 at Article 43, speaking of ―‗the authority of the legitimate 
power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant.‖ 
 
52 Ibid 46, at Article 43 
 
53 Ibid 46, at Article 43 
 
54 Ibid 46, at Article 44 
 
55 Ibid 47, at Article 51 
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convictions and liberty of worship.‖ 56 Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions also prohibits the destruction of the property, unless as an 
absolute military necessity, reinforcing the rule already laid down in 
the Hague Regulations‘ Article 46. 57 Articles 27 and 49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention prohibit the inhumane treatment of protected 
persons, 58 and individual or mass forcible transfer or deportations of 
civilians, 59 respectively.  
An Occupying Power also has certain affirmative duties under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, such as the obligation to guarantee the 
proper functioning of child-care and education institutions; 60 the 
Occupying Power must ensure the food and medical supplies of the 
population; 61 the Occupying Power must maintain medical and 
                                                          
56 Ibid 46, at Article 46 (1) 
 
57 Ibid 47, at Article 53 
 
58 Ibid 47, at Article 27 
 
59 Ibid 47, at Article 49 
 
60 Ibid 47, at Article 50 
 
61 Ibid 47, at Article 55 
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hospital services; 62 and the Occupying Power must allow national Red 
Cross societies to carry out their activities. 63   
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the drafters of the 
Geneva Conventions, well aware of the prolonged tendency of peace 
negotiations, ensured that a series of specific obligations on Occupying 
Powers persisted well beyond the ―general close of military operations.‖ 
Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions states that: 
―In the case of occupied territory… the Occupying Power shall be 
bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such 
Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, 
by the provisions of the following Articles of the present 
Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 
143.‖ 
It can be surmised that the drafters of the Hague Regulations 
and Geneva Conventions set out to provide considerable protections for 
civilian populations under occupation. The laws of occupation demand 
a number of essential affirmative duties on the Occupying Power in 
order to protect the population under occupation, while also giving 
leeway to the legitimate security concerns of the Occupying Power. The 
following section will consider how the laws of occupation in IHL 
treaties have developed, tracing how they have viewed both the 
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definition of occupation and the question of determining when 
occupation is established. 
Treaty Law 
 Article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides that: 
―Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends 
only to the territory where such authority has been established 
and can be exercised.‖ 64 
The Brussels Declaration of 1874 
 The above article, which is itself a rule of customary 
international law, 65 has origins in an earlier document known as the 
Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War, also known as the Brussels Declaration of 1874. 66 
The Brussels Declaration was the product of an attempt by Czar 
Alexander II of Russia in 1874 to bring together delegates from the 
European powers to draft an international agreement concerning the 
laws and customs of war.  
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 Participants in the drafting of the Brussels Declaration 
conference held lengthy deliberations on the specific meaning of 
belligerent occupation and the question of when such an occupation is 
actually established. The bulk of the participants‘ interactions centered 
on the minimum level of authority required for an occupant‘s power to 
be considered established. For instance, Major-General de Leer, the 
Russian delegate at the Brussels conference, argued that:  
"Occupation should be deemed to be established when one part 
of the occupying army has secured its positions and its line of 
communication with other corps. That being done the army is in 
a position to hold its own against the attacks of the army of the 
occupied territory, and against the rising of the population. If it 
cannot carry out this double object it is shorn of authority." 67 
In response, the German delegate, General de Voigts-Rhetz, 
warned of the dangers of associating the existence of occupation with 
visible military power too closely. He explained that:  
―If it be laid down that occupation only exists where the military 
power is visible, that will be encouraging insurrections, and if it 
be admitted that the inhabitants have a right to rise... as soon 
as the authority of the occupier is no longer visible, insurrections 
will break out, followed by cruel repressions, and the war will 
become barbarous." 68 
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 In other words, Voigts-Rhetz made the case that a territory 
would not have to be physically occupied in order to trigger the laws of 
occupation. Colonel Hammer, the delegate from Sweden, argued that: 
 ―To keep [an occupation] up, it is not necessary to employ a 
large number of troops; one man, provided he be respected, a 
post or telegraph office, a Commission of any kind established in 
the district, and performing its functions without opposition, 
would suffice; in a word, what is required is some fact proving 
that the territory, as such, can be under the military domination 
of the enemy.‖ 69 
The delegate from the Netherlands, M. van Lansberge, 
disagreed. He argued that:  
"It cannot be admitted that the presence of a single individual - 
of a single postmaster, for instance - is sufficient to perpetuate 
the right of occupation. This mode of holding a district would be 
too easy. The occupier must always be in sufficient force to put 
down an insurrection should one break out." 70 
For General Voigts-Rhetz, the power of an Occupying Power 
could be considered established when: 
―The Occupying Power may be considered practically established 
when the [occupied] population is disarmed, either by giving up 
its arms, or by having them taken from them, or again when the 
flying columns are traversing and the country and establishing 
relations with local authorities... There is, therefore, a 
distinction to be made: the population either rises during the 
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occupation, in which case it is subjected to the laws of war, or 
else it commences rising when the enemy is retreating, in which 
case it cannot be punished.‖ 71 
The varied views at the conference do not support a single 
agreement on the minimum level of authority required. Rather, they 
support the view that the drafters agreed that an Occupying Power 
does not necessarily have to control every single part of the occupied 
territory. In the words of the delegate from Russia, Baron Jomini, ―a 
province cannot be occupied at all points; that is impossible.‖ 72 
In the end, the Brussels Declaration conference unanimously 
adopted a declaration, which included the definition of occupation 
which appears verbatim in today's Article 42 of the Hague Regulations. 
It states: 
―Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends 
only to the territory where such authority has been established 
and can be exercised.‖ 73 
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 However, this Declaration failed to provide the basis for a 
treaty, as steps by the Russian government to study such a possibility 
proved unsuccessful. 74 
The Oxford Manual of 1880 
After the failure of the Brussels Declaration to produce a treaty, 
the Institute of International Law (IIL) sponsored a draft code for 
governments to include in their military manuals.  The draft was 
written by the President of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Gustave Moynier, and was subject to deliberation by the 
IIL‘s membership. In the end, the IIL adopted a final draft at a 
gathering in Oxford in September of 1880. It contained Article 41, 
which states: 
‗Territory is regarded as occupied when, as the consequence of 
invasion of hostile forces, the State to which it belongs has 
ceased, in fact, to exercise its ordinary authority therein, and the 
invading State is alone in a position to maintain order there. 
The limits within which this state of affairs exists determine the 
extent and duration of the occupation.‘ 75 
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 The Oxford Manual‘s definition of occupation is fairly restrictive 
compared to the one contained in the Brussels Declaration. The Oxford 
Manual requires an occupation to follow an invasion by hostile forces. 
The other requirements of the Oxford Manual include the 
displacement of the authority of the preceding state, as well as the 
position of the invading state to maintain order in the territory. 
Regarding the latter, it should be emphasized that the text mentions 
the Occupying Power‘s ability to exercise authority, not the actual 
exercise of authority. If the Occupying Power is in such a position, and 
the other criteria are satisfied, then there is an occupation. In which 
case, ―the occupant should take all due and needful measures to 
restore and ensure public order and public safety.‖ 76 
 After the adoption of the Oxford Manual‘s final draft, the IIL 
appealed to a number of European governments to incorporate a 
military manual similar to the Oxford Manual in their national 
legislation. However, most states paid no attention to that request.  77 
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The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 
 The Brussels Declaration and Oxford Manual were both 
important precursors to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 
1907. Participants the 1899 Hague Peace Conference sought to renew 
the project commissioned in the earlier Brussels Declaration. Fittingly 
then, the Brussels Declaration served as the foundation for the Hague 
Peace Conference and the deliberations that ensued on the provisions 
relating to occupation. While in the end, the participants unanimously 
adopted verbatim the text from Article 1 of the Brussels Declaration, 
the deliberations regarding the definition of occupation resembled 
those having taken place at in Brussels in 1874.  
For instance, the German delegate, Colonel Gross von 
Schwarzhoff, asked that the second paragraph, which states that 
―occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised,‖ be stricken out. He argued that 
the removal was necessary to provide for the case in which: 
"…a belligerent has effectively established his authority in a 
territory, but in which communications between the army or the 
occupying bodies and the other forces of the belligerent are 
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interrupted and in which uprisings occur in that territory and 
are momentarily successful."  78 
 The Russian delegate, Colonel Gilinski, supported Schwarzhoff‘s 
view, emphasizing from the military standpoint that:  
"An army considers a territory occupied when it finds itself 
therein either with the bulk of its troops or with detachments, 
and when the lines of communication are insured. On this 
territory the occupying army leaves troops to protect its 
communications in the rear. These troops are often not very 
numerous, so that an uprising becomes possible. However, the 
fact of such an uprising breaking out does not prevent the 
occupation from being considered actually existing." 79 
 Other delegates, however, did not share this view. The delegate 
from the Netherlands, General den Beer Poortugael, considered 
Schwarzhoff‘s proposal too broad, arguing that: 
"An occupation can be recognized only when the authority of the 
belligerent is actually established." 80 
Referring to the IIL‘s Oxford Manual, the delegate from 
Belgium, Chebalier Descamps, noted that: 
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"The Institute of International Law went further than the 
Brussels Conference and placed more restrictions on the notion 
of occupation. [Descamps] reads Article 41 of the Oxford Manual 
containing the definition of 'occupied territory.'" [Descamps] 
thinks that the omission of paragraph two would be contrary to 
all established ideas. It is impossible to recognize an occupation 
which does not exist. What must be absolutely preserved is the 
notion of occupation." 81 
The delegate from Siam, Edouard Rolin, proposed a compromise 
that would reproduce, with slight modifications, Article 41 of the 
Oxford Manual.  
"Territory is considered occupied by the enemy State when, as 
the consequence of invasion by hostile forces, the State to which 
this territory belongs has actually ceased to exercise its ordinary 
authority therein. The limits within which this state of affairs 
exists determine the extent and duration of the occupation." 82 
For Rolin, after an invasion of hostile forces, "the retirement of 
the legal authorities may best serve to determine whether there is 
occupation." 83 After such a withdrawal of the local authorities, "there 
is no longer more than one single authority that can be exercised, and 
that is the authority of the [Occupying Power]."  84 
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The delegate from Belgium, Auguste Beernaert, disagreed, 
stating that:  
―The definition of [the Brussels Declaration of] 1874 is 
preferable. The retirement of the legal authorities is a negative 
event which may very easily occur without there being an 
occupation." 85 
Beernaert‘s criticism was shared by the other Belgian delegate, 
Chevalier Descamps, who observed that:  
"According to Mr. Rolin's wording, there might be an occupation 
without the territory's really being occupied." 86 
 Ultimately, the delegate from France, Leon Bourgeois, observed 
that:  
"All the propositions thus far made in regard to Article 1 relate 
only to its details and not to its general idea... It would seem [to 
me] more prudent to preserve the wording adopted in [the 
Brussels Declaration of] 1874 after mature deliberations by all 
the representatives of the different powers. It would not be 
desirable to give Article 1, the pinnacle, as it were, of our work, 
a new, hastily prepared, and certainly incomplete definition 
which might give rise to serious difference of interpretation." 87 
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 At the suggestion of Bourgeois, the drafters unanimously 
decided to defer to Article 1 of the Brussels Declaration without any 
change as Article 42 of the 1899 Hague Regulations. 88 
It may be surmised from the Hague Peace Conference 
deliberations that the participants widely agreed that the Occupying 
Power must have at least some presence in the occupied territory. Only 
the statements of Rolin, the delegate from Siam, depart from this 
requirement. Instead, Rolin‘s proposal bases the existence of 
occupation on the withdrawal of the occupied territory‘s local 
authorities. It may also be said that, just as with the Brussels 
Declaration deliberations in 1874, no clear agreement was reached on 
the minimum level of authority an Occupying Power must exercise in 
the occupied territory.  
The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 adopted the 
verbatim Article 42 of the 1899 Hague regulations without 
deliberation. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
The subject of occupation was later assumed by the drafters of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While the Fourth Geneva Conventions 
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of 1949 did not depart from the definition of occupation provided in the 
Hague Regulations, it did add a number of provisions regulating the 
relationship between an occupying power and a local population. In 
addition, the 1949 Geneva Conventions included broad protections to 
civilians by emphasizing their protected status the moment they fall 
into the hands of an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 
Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV states: 
―Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case 
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict 
or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.‖ 89 
Additionally, the Conventions‘ drafters clearly intended to 
ensure the applicability of the Convention to occupations occurring in 
the absence of any state of war. During the 1949 Conference, 
participants unanimously voted to adopt Article 2, stating that:  
―In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in 
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total 
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if 
the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.‖ 90 
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The first sentence of the article clarifies that the Convention 
covers occupations occurring during hostilities but outside of a state of 
war. The second sentence ensures that the scope of the law of 
occupation cover situations where the occupation occurs without a 
declaration of war and without armed resistance. 
In light of these extensions of the scope of the laws of 
occupation, the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention makes 
the case that ―occupation‖ as used in the Convention has a broader 
meaning than it has in Article 42 of the Regulations annexed to the 
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. The Commentary bases this claim 
on the personal scope of the treaty, arguing that occupation as used in 
this context: 
―…has a wider meaning than it has in Article 42 of the 
Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. 
So far as individuals are concerned, the application of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention does not depend upon the existence 
of a state of occupation within the meaning of Article 42… the 
relations between the civilian population of a territory and 
troops advancing in to a territory, whether fighting or not, are 
governed by the present Convention. There is no intermediate 
period between what might be termed the invasion phase and 
the inauguration of a stable regime of occupation.‖ 91 
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 However, it must be noted here that apart from the inclusion of 
occupations meeting no armed resistance, there is no evidence in the 
travaux préparatoires of the Geneva Conventions indicating the 
participants intended to depart from the previously accepted notion of 
occupation in the Hague Regulations. This suggests that the definition 
of occupation in the Conventions is not more expansive, but rather, 
matches that in the Hague Regulations‘ Article 42 identically. This 
view is confirmed by the fact that, as this paper will demonstrate in 
subsequent sections, contemporary international jurisprudence 
continues to rely on the Hague Regulations‘ definition of occupation in 
determining the applicability of the Geneva Conventions.  
Additional Protocol I 
 The first article of Additional Protocol I states that the Protocol 
applies in the situations referred to in Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions. Accordingly, the designation of occupation remains the 
same as that used in the Geneva Conventions. However, Article 1(1) of 
Additional Protocol widens the scope of application to include: 
―…armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on [the] 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
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and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations.‖ 92 
 The Protocol does not explicitly define the term ―alien 
occupation,‖ however, commentators have defined the term in the 
following manner: 
"This term is meant to cover cases in which a High Contracting 
Party occupied territories of a State which is not a High 
Contracting Party, or territories with a controversial 
international status, and to establish that the population of such 
territory is fighting against the occupant in the exercise of their 
right to self-determination." 93 
 The purpose of Article 1(4), then, is to ensure that the law of 
occupation covers situations in which a territory, before being 
occupied, was not universally viewed as the territory of a High 
Contracting Party. The most obvious examples are the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank, in which Israel argued that because it had not 
displaced a recognized sovereign state in taking control of territory, 
that the laws of occupation did not apply. 94 
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Overview 
 The preceding sections should demonstrate that the concept of 
occupation referred to in the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I is based on the concept of occupation contained in the 
Brussels Declaration of 1874. The travaux préparatoires of these IHL 
treaties establish two basic elements of occupation; (1) the occupied 
population‘s deprival of their former government‘s ability to publicly 
exercise its authority; (2) and the Occupying Power‘s position to 
substitute its own authority for that of the former government. 95 As 
underscored in the words ―actually‖ and ―in fact,‖ which appear so 
often in the provisions of the aforementioned IHL treaties, both of 
these determinations are largely factual findings. 
The second element, regarding the ability of the Occupying 
Power to substitute its authority, proves the more difficult to 
determine. It would not suffice for an Occupying Power to simply issue 
a declaration that a territory has been occupied. The IHL treaties state 
that the Occupying Power‘s authority must actually be established. In 
view of that, many legal scholars have argued that the concept of 
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occupation parallels that of a blockade, in the sense that it only exists 
if it is effective. For instance, following the adoption of the Hague 
Regulations, TJ Lawrence argued that: 
―…occupation on land is analogous to blockade at sea; and as 
blockades are not recognized unless they are effective, so 
occupation must rest on effective control. Its rights are founded 
on mere force, and therefore they cannot extend beyond the area 
of available force. But the force need not be actually on the spot. 
The country embraced within the invader‘s lines may be very 
extensive, and the bulk of his troops will, of course, be found on 
its outer edge opposing the armies of the invaded state. Any 
territory covered by the front of the invaders should be held to 
be occupied, but not territory far in advance of their main 
bodies. The fact that it is penetrated here and there by scouts 
and advance guards does not bring it under firm control, and 
therefore cannot support a claim to have deprived the invaded 
state of all authority therein. But the rights of occupancy, once 
acquired, remain until the occupier is completely dispossessed.‖ 
96 
Additionally, while the establishment of a military 
administration in an occupied territory is certainly an indication of the 
existence of occupation, it is not a requirement. Article 43 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations sets out various obligations on the Occupying 
Power ―to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety‖ in the occupied areas. 97 This undertaking may necessitate the 
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creation of a military administration, however, taking upon this 
obligation only occurs after an occupation already exists. For the 
occupation to exist at all, it is only required that the Occupying Power 
be in a position to substitute its own authority for that of the displaced 
government. In other words, it is not the actual exercise of the 
Occupying Power‘s authority that determines occupation, but their 
ability to do so. If all that was required was that the Occupying Power 
exercise its authority, then an Occupying Power would be able to evade 
its obligations easily by not establishing the authority that it is in a 
position to exercise. Accordingly, it is not necessary for an Occupying 
Power to have ground troops present in the entire territory it occupies 
to be considered an occupation. 
On this issue, commentator JM Spaight has argued that ―while 
a commander is not required to picket the whole country and to 
garrison every hamlet, in order to establish his occupation, he must not 
proclaim as occupied a territory in which his troops have not, and could 
not, set foot.‖ 98 Again, the parallel between the criteria for occupation 
and that for blockades is apt. JM Spaight writes: 
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―To establish an effective blockade there need not be a line of 
cruisers drawn across the mouth of a harbor, but there must be 
some force within striking distance, so as to make it difficult for 
any vessel to ‗run the blockade‘ and gain entrance; and the same 
principle governs occupation.‖ 99 
The instruments of IHL all seem to agree that the Occupying 
Power must have the ability in the occupied territory to establish its 
authority there for there to be an occupation. However, as the travaux 
préparatoires demonstrate, the criteria for determining when an 
occupation has begun is described very generally. Indeed, the 
provisions on the criteria for determining when an occupation begins 
were often the result of compromises agreed on by the participants at 
these conferences. For instance, the delegates at the Hague 
Regulations were unable to agree on a formulation and consequently, 
deferred to the wording of the earlier Brussels Declaration. 
Where IHL treaties do not provide enough clarity, however, the 
practices of states are often consulted to fill in the blanks.  However, 
national court hearings to apply rules of international law are beset by 
the fact that their judgments represent the perspective of only one 
party to the IHL instrument in question. Accordingly, they do not carry 
as much weight in an international context as the interpretation of an 
IHL instrument by an international court. These types of judgments 
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are more protected from the criticism that they serve any government‘s 
political or legal agenda.  
Case Law 
The Hostages trial 
The period immediately following World War II provided the 
first opportunity for judicial consideration of the laws of war relating to 
occupation.  In the Hostages case, the American Military Tribunal 
brought high-ranking German military officers to trial for offenses 
committed by troops under their command in the course of the 
occupation of Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Norway.  
Despite the vulnerability of national courts criticism mentioned 
above, the Hostages case has been frequently cited by international 
tribunals, and in consideration of its weight, will be discussed here. 
The trial is only international in that it was rooted in the Allied 
Control Council Law No. 10, regarding the Punishment of Persons 
Guilty of War Crimes or Crimes against Peace and Humanity. Control 
Council Law No. 10 was enacted shortly after the beginning of the 
Nuremberg Trial, and authorized every Occupying Power to try 
persons suspects of war crimes, crimes against peace and against 
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humanity independent of the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg. 100 
A number of the charges in the Hostages trial were for violations 
of the law of occupation. Accordingly, the Tribunal had to decide 
whether there was an occupation as defined by Article 42 of the 1907 
Hague Regulations. Their ruling differentiated between the period of 
invasion and the period of occupation, holding that: 
―The question of criminality in many cases may well hinge on 
whether an invasion was in progress or an occupation 
accomplished. Whether an invasion has developed into an 
occupation is a question of fact. The term invasion implies a 
military operation while an occupation indicates the exercise of 
governmental authority to the exclusion of the established 
government. This presupposes the destruction of organized 
resistance and the establishment of an administration to 
preserve law and order. To the extent that the occupant‘s control 
is maintained and that of the civil government eliminated, the 
area will be said to be occupied.‖ 101 
The Tribunal ruled that nine days after the German invasion of 
Yugoslavia, ―the powers of government passed into the hands of the 
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German armed forces and Yugoslavia became occupied territory.‖ 102 
During the period of occupation armed resistance movements began to 
develop, eventually regaining partial control of the sections of the 
territories. However, the Tribunal ruled that ―while it is true that the 
partisans were able to control sections of these countries at various 
times, it is established that the Germans could at anytime they desired 
assume physical control of any part of the country.‖ 103 Thus, the 
Tribunal did not consider this sufficient to negate the existence of 
occupation.  
The judgment in the Hostages trial reiterates the view that it is 
not required for an Occupying Power to maintain a military presence 
in every part of the territory for there to be an occupation. The 
Tribunal ruled that even if armed resistance forces recoup partial 
control of the territory, it has no effect on the status of the territory as 
occupied. This view parallels the deliberations of the Brussels 
Declaration and 1899 Hague Conferences. 104  
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
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Unlike the American Military Tribunal in the Hostages trial, the 
judgments of the ICTY represent an example of the interpretation of 
an international instrument by an international court. The ICTY‘s 
jurisdiction encompasses grave breaches of the laws and customs of 
war, which include occupation law. These breaches have been 
prosecuted before the tribunal in cases such as the trial of Martinović 
and Naletilić.  
The indictment against Martinović and Naletilić included 22 
counts, each alleging responsibility for having committed crimes 
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
violations of the laws and customs of war. Count 5, dealing with 
unlawful labor of civilians, Count 18, dealing with the forcible transfer 
of civilians and Count 19, dealing with the destruction of property, 
related to breaches of the law of occupation. Accordingly, the ICTY was 
forced to decide whether parts of Bosnian territory in 1993 and 1994 
could be considered occupied. 105 The Tribunal ruled that: 
―In the absence of a definition of ―occupation‖ in the Geneva 
Conventions, the Chamber refers to the Hague Regulations and 
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the definition provided therein, bearing in mind the customary 
nature of the Regulations. 
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides the following 
definition of occupation: 
‗Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation 
extends only to the territory where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised.‘ 
The Chamber endorses this definition.‖ 106 
In other words, the Tribunal endorsed the definition of 
occupation contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations. The Tribunal 
argued that since the Geneva Convention represents a further 
codification of the obligations of the Occupying Power, in absence of a 
definition of occupation in the Conventions, the Hague Regulations‘ 
definition could be used, bearing in mind the customary nature of the 
latter. 
Furthermore, the ICTY outlined the following criteria to provide 
some basic direction in determining whether the authority of the 
Occupying Power has actually been established: 
o ―the occupying power must be in a position to substitute its own 
authority for that of the occupied authorities, which must have 
been rendered incapable of functioning publicly; 
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o the enemy‘s forces have surrendered, been defeated or 
withdrawn. In this respect, battle areas may not be considered 
as occupied territory. However, sporadic local resistance, even 
successful, does not affect the reality of occupation; 
 
o the occupying power has a sufficient force present, or the 
capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to make the 
authority of the occupying power felt; 
 
o a temporary administration has been established over the 
territory; 
 
o the occupying power has issued and enforced directions to the 
civilian population.‖ 107 
These guidelines were derived mainly from various State practice, 
including the military manuals of the United Kingdom, the United 
States, New Zealand and Germany. It should be noted that the ICTY 
did not submit that all such criteria must be met for an occupation to 
be considered established. Rather, the ICTY considered the satisfaction 
of one or more of these criteria to be of assistance in making such a 
determination.   
It should also be noted that the ICTY deliberated on the application 
of the laws of occupation to protected persons under the Geneva 
Convention IV. The Trial Chamber held that: 
―The application of the law of occupation as it effects ―individuals‖ 
as civilians protected under Geneva Convention IV does not require 
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that the occupying power have actual authority. For the purposes of 
those individuals‘ rights, a state of occupation exists upon their 
falling into ―the hands of the occupying power.‖ 108 
In short, the ICTY adopted the view that the application of the laws 
of occupation to individual protected persons under GC IV does not 
require the Occupying Power to have actual authority. This was done 
in order to ensure the protection of civilians to the fullest extent 
possible, as, during an intermediate period, civilians may be left with 
less protections than they would have once an occupation is 
established. In that sense, it differs from its application under Article 
42 of the Hague Regulations.  
The International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the primary judicial 
organ of the United Nations, is perhaps the most authoritative 
international court. The question of occupation has been considered by 
the ICJ in a recent case, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 109 This case began in 
2003 at the request of the UN General Assembly‘s Tenth Emergency 
Special Session. It addressed: 
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109 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Rep. (2004) 
p[. 136 
 
 45  
 
―What are the legal consequences arising from the construction 
of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East 
Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, 
considering the rules and principles of international law, 
including the Fourth Geneva Convention of1949, and relevant 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?‖ 110 
In considering the merits of the case, the ICJ commenced with a 
brief investigation of the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza. The 
ICJ referred to Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, and while 
Israel has not acceded to the Hague Convention, the ICJ did not 
consider this relevant on account of their customary international-law 
status. The Court had already held that the provisions of the Hague 
Regulations have become part of customary law in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 111 
The Court held that the Gaza Strip and West Bank ―were occupied by 
Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict… Under customary 
international law, these were therefore occupied territories in which 
Israel had the status of an Occupying Power.‖ 112 
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It can be surmised that the Court viewed the concept of 
occupation under the Geneva Conventions identically to the concept of 
occupation under the Hague Regulations. 113 If this observation were 
not so, it would not be possible to explain the Court‘s reliance on the 
definition in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations to determine whether 
the provisions of occupation in the Geneva Convention are applicable 
to the West Bank and Gaza.  
Overview 
The above summation of international case law suggests a 
number of conclusions that have been similarly drawn from the IHL 
treaties consulted earlier. 114 Firstly, the case law should demonstrate 
the international courts‘ repeated reliance on the definition of 
occupation contained in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations. 115 Aside 
from the Geneva Conventions‘ extension of the scope of the laws of 
occupation to apply to occupations which are not met with resistance, 
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the term occupation seems today to have the same meaning as it does 
in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 116  
Secondly, the case law should demonstrate that two elements 
continue to form the basis for the determination of whether an 
occupation can be considered established. These concepts consist of a 
negative and a positive element. The negative element is that territory 
which has been occupied has been rendered incapable of exercising 
authority over the territory. The positive element is that the Occupying 
Power is in a position to exercise its own authority in the occupied 
authorities. This positive element is reiterated in Article 42 of the 
Hague Regulations‘ requirement that territory ―is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army.‖ 117 
Finally, the case law should demonstrate that this control must 
be effective. In this context, effectiveness entails that the Occupying 
Power has, in the words of the ICTY, ―a sufficient force present, or the 
capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to make the authority 
of the Occupying Power felt.‖ 118 With that said, the case law shows 
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that the Occupying Power does not necessarily need to control every 
single part of the occupied territory for it to be considered occupied. 119 
Even if a resistance movement were to assume control over a portion of 
occupied territory, the territory is still considered occupied provided 
that the Occupying Power is able to take over control at any time. 120 
As the ICJ‘s Wall judgment demonstrates, Israel satisfies the 
criteria for occupation with regard to the Gaza Strip up to 2005. 121 The 
subsequent sections will consider the question of whether the same can 
be said during the period befalling Operation Cast Lead.   
International Jurisprudence 
The Legal Status of the Gaza Strip: 1967 - 2005 
 Israel occupied the Gaza Strip in the course of the Six Day War 
in June 1967. 122 Soon after, it established a civil administration that 
assumed the responsibility for public services for the Palestinian 
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population. 123 In the course of the next 27 years, the Israeli civil 
administration managed public services in the Gaza Strip. That 
changed following the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 
1994. The PA - which is the product of a series of agreements between 
the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) between 1993 and 1998 known as the Oslo Accords - took over 
some of the administrative responsibilities in parts of the Gaza Strip. 
124 However, the PA‘s limited exercise of power meant that the 
majority of the expenses for public services in the Gaza Strip were no 
longer paid being for by Israel through the civil administration. 125 The 
PA struggled to raise the enough money to cover these services 
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domestically, however, international donors agreed to generously 
support the PA over the next decade. 126 
Notwithstanding the responsibilities of the new PA and support 
of international donors, Israel remained legally responsible for the 
welfare of the occupied population. 127 Moreover, the transfer of limited 
administrative powers to the Palestinian Authority in 1994 did not 
change the legal status of the Gaza Strip from 1994-2005. 128  A great 
deal of scholarship has been written on the status of the Gaza Strip as 
occupied territory during this period. 129 For present purposes, only the 
following needs to be said on this regard. From the point of view of 
international law, Israel‘s presence in the Gaza Strip throughout the 
entire period of 1967 to 2005 was resoundingly and internationally as 
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that of belligerent occupation. 130 This view has been reiterated in the 
four decades spanning this period by authorities such as the Red 
Cross, the High Contracting Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the ICJ. 131 
Likewise, it should also be noted that throughout this period, 
Israel disputed its status as an Occupying Power. The official position 
of the Israeli government was that the Gaza Strip was ―administered‖ 
or ―disputed‖ territory, as opposed to occupied territory, because 
neither Egypt nor Jordan had sovereignty over these territories (the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank, respectively) when their administrations 
were displaced during the Six Day War. 132 Accordingly, Israel has 
challenged the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
on the grounds they were not under the sovereignty of a High 
Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions. However, this 
                                                          
130 Ibid 9-14 
 
131 See Wall Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 86-101, for summation of 
this discussion   
132 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ―Forgotten Facts About the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip,‖ (February 2003), available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/2/DISPUTE
D%20TERRITORIES-%20Forgotten%20Facts%20About%20the%20We 
 
 52  
 
interpretation of Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention was 
unanimously rejected by the ICJ in the Wall advisory opinion. 133 
In the Wall advisory opinion, the Court found that the question 
of an occupied territory being under the sovereignty of one of the 
parties to the conflict is irrelevant to the determination of occupation. 
134 This was a unanimous finding, as the lone dissenting judge, Judge 
Buergenthal, expressly concurred on this regard. 135 Accordingly, the 
Wall advisory opinion unanimously rejected Israel‘s challenge of the 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Palestinian 
territories, marking an authoritative recognition that Israel had the 
status of occupant in the West Bank, and by extension East Jerusalem 
and the Gaza Strip.  
While the government of Israel has rejected the overall de jure 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Israeli judiciary 
has consistently supported the application of the 1907 Hague 
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Regulations to the Gaza Strip. At various stages, the Israeli courts 
have recognized that the framework governing the Gaza Strip is that 
of belligerent occupation and that relevant customary laws are to be 
applied. 136 Additionally, the Israeli courts have stated that they will 
respect the ―humanitarian provisions‖ of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, although no actual list has ever been provided of what 
provisions those are. 137 The vast majority of states, almost all 
government experts and international scholars, the United Nations 
and ICRC have opposed the selective application of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention by Israel, arguing instead for the full de jure applicability 
to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 138 The Wall advisory opinion 
reiterates the general view, affirming the full applicability of the 
Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Conventions to the West 
Bank (and by extension the Gaza Strip). Accordingly, it is untenable 
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for Israel to challenge its status occupation with regard to the Gaza 
Strip up to 2004. 139   
The Legal Status of the Gaza Strip: 2005 and beyond 
On April 14, 2004, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sent a letter to 
President George W. Bush outlining an initiative for the 
dismantlement of settlements and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from permanent military bases inside the Gaza Strip. 140 
President Bush welcomed the initiative, praising it as ―a bold and 
historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace.‖ 
141 The so-called Disengagement Plan was, according to the Israeli 
Prime Minister, meant to ―reduce friction between Israelis and 
Palestinians… improve security for Israel and stabilize [Israel‘s] 
political and economic situation.‖ 142  
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After the Prime Minister‘s own Likud party voted down the plan 
by a 20-point margin in a non-binding referendum in early May 2004, 
143 the Israeli Prime Minister issued a revised version on June 6, 2004. 
144 The Revised Disengagement Plan was passed by the Israeli Knesset 
on October 26, 2004, and approved by the Israeli cabinet on February 
20, 2005. 145 The core component of the revised Plan was still a 
unilateral withdrawal of Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip and four 
settlements in the northern West Bank. 146 Additionally, the Plan 
would order the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from all 
of the ―evacuated‖ areas, the dismantlement of all military 
installations and redeployment of IDF forces outside these areas. 147  
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On the other hand, the text of the revised Plan stipulates the 
continuance of Israel‘s military presence in the Gaza Strip in a number 
of ways. For instance, it specifies that Israel will continue to exercise 
security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.  148 This 
necessitates the continued presence of Israel‘s military in Gaza‘s 
territorial waters. The plan also stipulates that Israel will maintain 
exclusive authority over Gaza‘s airspace. 149 Again, this entails the 
continued presence of Israel‘s military in Gaza‘s skies. In addition, the 
text of the revised Plan stipulates that Israeli military forces will 
remain in the Egyptian-Gazan border area known as the Philadalphi 
Route, 150 and explicitly reserves the possibility that the area where 
Israel‘s military forces remain will be expanded when required by 
―security considerations.‖ 151 Finally, the text of the Plan lays down 
that Israel will continue to guard and monitor the rest of the external 
land perimeter of the Gaza Strip. 152 
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Amid much media attention, Israel moved forward with the 
implementation of the Plan in 2005. On Monday, September 12, 2005, 
at approximately 7:00 A.M., the last convoy of Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) departed from the Gaza Strip. In a brief ceremony at one of the 
exit gates, IDF Briadier-General Aviv Kochavi proclaimed that ―the 
responsibility for whatever takes place inside befalls upon the 
[Palestinian] Authority.‖ 153 That same day, the IDF Chief of Southern 
Command, Major-General Dan Harel, signed an official decree 
proclaiming the end of Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip. 154 The 
original draft of the Disengagement Plan explicitly expressed the 
Israeli government‘s view that the implementation of the Plan will end 
the status of the Gaza Strip as occupied territory, noting that: 
―Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any 
permanent presence of Israel security forces or Israeli civilians 
in the areas of Gaza Strip . . . . As a result, there will be no basis 
for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.‖ 155 
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Israel‘s Revised Disengagement Plan, like the original draft, 
similarly disavows Israel‘s continued obligations toward the 
inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, stating that:  
―The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims 
regarding Israel‘s responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip.‖ 156 
This statement expresses the continued view of the Israeli 
government that the implementation of the Disengagement Plan will 
mark the end of the occupation of the Gaza Strip, since the occupation 
is the basis of Israel‘s responsibilities toward the Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Negotiation Affairs Department (PNAD), 
for their part, quickly responded at the time that, legally speaking, the 
status of the Gaza Strip would remain unchanged in the aftermath of 
the Plan‘s implementation. 157 The PNAD argued that: 
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―Israel will retain effective military, economic, and 
administrative control over the Gaza Strip and will therefore 
continue to occupy the Gaza Strip—even after implementation of 
its ―Disengagement Plan‖ as proposed. Because Israel will 
continue to occupy Gaza, it will still be bound by the provisions 
of 1907‘s Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
and relative international customary law.‖ 158 
When do Military Occupations End? 
The Hague Regulations 
The conditions required to bring an end to occupation are closely 
linked with the conditions triggering the law of occupation‘s 
application. 159 No article in the Hague Regulations explicitly refers to 
the conditions required for the termination of occupation. However, 
Article 42 does state that the law of occupation will continue to apply, 
regardless of whether the initial armed conflict ended, 160 as long as 
that the territory remains "under the authority of the hostile army," 
and wherein that authority has "been established and can be 
                                                          
158 Ibid, at Section IV: Conclusion 
 
159 See Adam Roberts, ―The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004,‖ The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 54, (January 2005): 
pp. 28-29; Adam Roberts, ―Transformative Military Occupation: 
Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights,‖ The American Journal 
of International Law Vol. 100, No. 580 (2006): pp. 580,  available at: 
http://ccw.modhist.ox.ac.uk/publications/roberts_militaryoccupation.pd
f 
 
160 Ibid 47, at Article 6 
 
 60  
 
exercised." 161 Reference must also be made to Article 6 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. This Article determines that the Convention 
ceases to apply to occupied territory upon one year of the general close 
of military operations. However, if the Occupying Power exercises the 
function of government in the Occupied Territory, a series of provisions 
of the Convention continue to apply. 162  
Criteria for the Termination of Occupation 
The authorities discussed in the preceding sections of this paper 
should support the proposition that two elements lie at the core of 
when a territory can be considered occupied: a) the Occupying Power‘s 
ability, or position, to exercise its authority within the territory and; b) 
that the indigenous authorities of the occupied territory have been 
rendered incapable of functioning publicly.  163 
Accordingly, this paper will use these two criteria‘s reversal as 
the basis for determining when an occupation has ended. When the 
conditions triggering the application of the law of occupation have been 
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negated, the occupation may be considered to have been terminated. 
From the perspective of IHL, the test for when the criteria apply is 
fundamentally a factual one. 164 Just as an occupant‘s formal 
proclamation of a territory as occupied has little bearing on the legal 
determination of the territory, an occupant‘s proclamation that a 
territory is no longer occupied is equally irrelevant. 165 It is the reality 
on the ground, and not the label, that matters. Thus, both the 
beginning and the end of occupation are ultimately questions of fact. 
The core elements of occupation must be evaluated in light of the 
existing facts pertaining thereto to arrive at the occupied status of a 
territory. If the test fails any of the core elements of occupation, it 
follows that occupation does not exist. 
According to British scholar of international relations, Adam 
Roberts, the method through which the end of occupation typically 
occurs is when foreign troops leave. 166 However, Roberts is keen to 
point out that while ―in many cases such a statement poses no 
problems. However, the withdrawal of occupying forces is not the sole 
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criterion of the ending of an occupation.‖ 167 Indeed, from the 
perspective of IHL, the relevant criteria for the termination of 
occupation are clear.  
As mentioned previously, under the framework of the Hague 
Regulations, a territory is no longer occupied when the occupying 
power can no longer exercise its authority. Only when, and where, the 
authority of the Occupying Power ―has been established and can be 
exercised‖ does territory become subject to the law of occupation. The 
test of an Occupying Power‘s ability, or position, to exercise this 
authority is often referred to as effective control in IHL literature. 168 
The test of effective control test does not hinge on the military presence 
of the Occupying Power in all parts of a territory, but the extent to 
which an occupant, through its military presence, can exert effective 
control over the territory. 
The international jurisprudence on occupation concurs in this 
regard. A critical recognition of the Hostages trial was that an 
Occupying Power can exercise effective control over an area without 
maintaining troop presence in parts thereof. Greece and Yugoslavia, 
which were outside of Germany‘s actual control at various stages, were 
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considered occupied territory by the military tribunal in Nuremberg, 
under the reasoning that ―the Germans could at any time they desired 
assume physical control of any part of the [Greece and Yugoslavia].‖ 169 
Once again, whether an Occupying Power has effective control is 
always a factual determination. In the case of the Gaza Strip, Israel‘s 
claim that its occupation of the Gaza Strip has been terminated raises 
a number of questions. The following section will address the extent to 
which effective control has persisted in the aftermath of Israel‘s so-
called Disengagement Plan. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Gaza Strip 170 
 
Effective Control 
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Gaza‘s Land Crossings 
The entire land border of the Gaza Strip is enveloped by a 
separation barrier first constructed by Israel in 1994 on the 1950 
Armistice (Green Line), and extended in 2005 to encompass the border 
between Gaza and Egypt. 171 The structure of the fence is composed of 
wire fencing with posts, sensors and buffer zones aligning areas 
bordering Israel, and concrete and steel walls on lands bordering 
Egypt. 
Since there has been no passage of people or goods into Gaza via 
sea or air has since Israel occupied the Gaza Strip in 1967, 172 
everything going in or out of Gaza takes place at one Gaza‘s land 
crossings. As of March 2011, pedestrian entry into the Gaza Strip by 
land is limited to two terminals; the northern Erez Crossing on the 
Israeli-Gaza border, and the southern Rafah Crossing on the Egyptian-
                                                          
171 Anne Barnard, ―Life in Gaza Steadily Worsens,‖ The Boston Globe, 
October 22, 2006, available at: 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/10/22/life_i
n_gaza_steadily_worsens/ 
 
172 Sari Bashi and Kenneth Mann, ―Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal 
Status of Gaza,‖ (January 2007): pp. 47, available at: 
http://www.gisha.org/lUserFiles/File/Report%20for%20the%20website.
pdf 
 
 66  
 
Gazan border. 173 The only other presently open terminal, the Kerem 
Shalom Crossing, is used only for cargo.174 
At the end of February 2011, the conveyer belt at the Karni 
crossing (used only for cargo) was shut down permanently. 175 This 
followed the closure of the rest of the Karni crossing in June 2007, the 
closure of the Sufa Crossing in 2008, and of Nahal Oz in January 2010. 
176 As a result, all cargo seeking to cross the Gaza-Israeli border are 
currently limited to the Kerem Shalom crossing. 177  
The Movement of People 
The Erez Crossing 
Despite Israel‘s evacuation of its permanent ground troops out of 
the Gaza Strip, Israel has continued to control significant aspects of 
life in the Gaza Strip, especially the movement of people via Gaza‘s 
land border crossings. The Erez crossing, nestled on the Israeli-Gaza 
border, is currently the only pedestrian terminal, besides Rafah, which 
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allows Gaza‘s residents access to the outside world. In the post-
Disengagement period, Israel has frequently used its full control over 
the Erez border crossings to impose arbitrary closures. 178  
With very few exceptions, the movement of people out of Gaza 
through the Erez crossing is prohibited. 179 Only those who meet the 
government of Israel‘s criteria for an exceptional permit are allowed 
passage. 180 Acquiring the permit application has been described by the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of 
the occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA oPt) as ―time consuming, 
arduous and uncertain.‖ 181 Additionally, applications submitted by 
Gaza residents who meet the established criteria are subject to denial 
on security grounds, a veto which is often exercised, without any 
elucidation on the details as to why. 182  When an initial application is 
denied, the resident assumes the burden of proof of dispelling these 
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claims, a process that often necessitates lengthy and costly follow-up. 
183 
The difficulty associated with obtaining a permit was addressed 
in a statement by Israel‘s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in 
June 2010. 184 The document notes Israel‘s plans to ―streamline the 
policy of permitting the entry and exit of people,‖ and to ―consider 
additional ways to facilitate the movement of people to and from 
Gaza.‖ 185 However, observers on the ground have noted that in 
practice, very little has changed. 186 According to OCHA oPt, ―only an 
insignificant increase was recorded in the volume of people traveling 
through the Erez crossing in the second half of 2010 compared to the 
previous half – from 106 to 114 persons a day.‖ 187 
The OCHA oPt has further noted that: 
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―Gaps in the availability of key medical services, generated by 
decades of neglect and compounded since the imposition of the 
blockade, have created the need to refer patients to hospitals 
outside Gaza for specialized medical treatment. The process 
needed to obtain an exit permit adds anguish and stress to 
people already vulnerable due to illness. While the nature of this 
process has not changed since the relaxation announcement, the 
average rate of approval increased from 76 to 81 percent 
between the first and second halves of 2010. In other words, 
during the latter, one out of five patients still missed their 
hospital appointment because their permits were denied or 
delayed.‖ 188 
 OCHA oPt goes further in describing the effects of restrictions of 
travel on Gaza‘s overall health, noting that:  
―Specialized medical knowledge requires months and years of 
training in medical units that are only available in the West 
Bank, particularly in East Jerusalem. However, travel 
restrictions make access to such training impossible for most 
medical staff. Significant capacity shortages exist in the area of 
cardiovascular diseases, oncology, ophthalmology, orthopedics 
and neurosurgery, areas that accounted for the majority of 
referrals outside Gaza in the past five years. In the second half 
of 2010, a total of 44 medical staff members were issued permits 
to attend trainings outside Gaza, a significant increase 
compared to the previous six months (19 permits), but an 
insignificant fraction of the actual needs.‖ 189 
The OCHA oPT‘s report also discusses Israel‘s policy regarding 
student access to universities outside the Gaza Strip. 
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―The policy regarding access for students to universities in the 
West Bank or elsewhere is even more restrictive; in 2010 only 
three such permits were granted. This policy is particularly 
detrimental in the case of students wishing to study academic 
disciplines available in West Bank universities but not in Gaza, 
such as dentistry, occupational therapy, medical engineering, 
veterinary medicine, environmental protection, human rights 
law, and chemistry (PhD level).‖ 190 
In sum, the OCHA oPt concludes that "Israel continues to 
exercise effective control over the access of people to the outside world 
via Israel." 191 This access has been subject to increasingly severe 
restrictions following the imposition of the blockade in June 2007. 192 
Indeed, the data on entry of persons into and out of the Gaza Strip 
indicates that post-blockade passage remains well below that of the 
pre-blockade period, 193 although the figures for preceding the 2007 
blockade, but after the implementation of the 2005 disengagement 
were still "an insignificant fraction of the actual needs." 194 
The Rafah Crossing 
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The restrictions of persons through the Erez crossing, as well as 
Israel's gradual closure of the all the other pedestrian exit/entry 
terminals of the Gaza Strip, should be seen in the context of the 
dependency it has created for Gazans upon the Rafah crossing for 
access to the outside world. In the period following the 2005 
Disengagement Plan, Israel has (at various stages) exercised both 
direct and indirect control of the Rafah crossing between Israel and 
Gaza, notwithstanding the fact that the crossing is not located on a 
border of Israeli territory. 
In fact, directly after the Disengagement Plan‘s implementation, 
the Israeli armed forces retained their pre-Disengagement military 
presence and control of the Rafah border crossing. 195 During this 
period, Israel imposed the closure of the Rafah border crossing, 
resulting in damaging effects on the medical care, education and 
economy of the Gaza Strip.196 This continued until November 2005, 
when an arrangement known as the Agreement on Movement and 
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Access (AMA) was reached between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority. 197 The terms of the AMA call for the Palestinian Authority 
to operate the Rafah Crossing with the support of the European Union 
Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) and under the surveillance of 
Israeli video-monitors. 198  
Although the language of the AMA indicates that Israel‘s role in 
the Rafah crossing would be largely advisory, in practice, Israel has 
exercised significant residual control over the entry of persons into 
Gaza via Rafah to this day. With very few exceptions, entry into Gaza 
through the Rafah crossing is limited to ―Palestinian residents‖ (those 
registered under the Israeli-controlled Palestinian population registry 
and who hold Palestinian identity cards). 199 Moreover, Israel reserves 
the right to block the entrance of any Palestinian residents whom 
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Israel considers to be ―terrorist activists.‖ 200 Additionally, even in the 
excepted categories (diplomats, foreign investors, foreign 
representatives of recognized international organizations and 
humanitarian cases) the ability of a foreigner to cross the Rafah 
terminal is subject to Israeli veto. 201  
Throughout the post-blockade period, Israel closed the Rafah 
border crossing entirely, with the exception of an extremely limited 
passage of people and cargo. Israel‘s justifications for the closure were 
that, given the absence of security personnel loyal to the Palestinian 
Authority on the Gaza side of the crossings, it could not allow the 
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opening of the passenger crossing at Rafah. 202 Ever since, Israel has 
prohibited all entry into or out of Gaza, except ―via sporadic, ad hoc 
crossing for humanitarian cases… Since March 2008, Rafah has 
opened approximately once per month, each time permitting hundreds 
of Palestinian ID card-holders and Egyptian citizens to enter and leave 
Gaza.‖ 203 These figures are derived from Gisha, an Israeli NGO which 
focuses on Gaza residents‘ freedom of movement. The figures from the 
OCHA oPt vary slightly, noting that the Rafah crossing ―opened 
erratically, usually no more than two-three days every month.‖ 204 
The passage of persons via Rafah improved slightly following 
the flotilla incident in early June 2010, 205 when Egypt eased their 
policy regarding the opening of the Rafah crossing between Gaza and 
Egypt. According to Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement: 
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"Egypt, which has the physical capacity to open Rafah Crossing, 
closes it as the result of pressure exerted on it by Israel and 
other parties in order to promote its own interests, not to 
recognize the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and not to 
allow a connection between it and Egyptian entities that oppose 
the government. The closure of the Gaza Strip and the suffering 
of its residents create pressure on Egypt to open the crossing, 
and it does so for humanitarian purposes, sporadically and ad 
hoc, informing Israel of these openings. Those openings satisfy 
the travel needs of only a fraction of the residents of Gaza." 206 
Nonetheless, Egypt‘s minor ease of restrictions on passage 
through the Rafah crossing in June 2010 has lead the OCHA oPt to 
note that:  
―Since early June 2010, the [Rafah] crossing has operated six 
(later reduced to five) days a week, on a regular basis. This 
change improved the access of the population to the outside 
world, but only for those defined as ‗humanitarian cases‘, 
including mostly patients and students, as well as foreign 
passport holders. Overall, in the second half of 2010, an average 
of 315 people crossed Rafah in each direction every day, less 
than half the equivalent figure in the first five months of 2006 
(650), before restrictions at this crossing started.‖ 207 
In sum, although Israeli forces are no longer stationed on the 
Rafah crossing permanently, Israel has (both before, as well as after 
Operation Cast Lead) exercised indirect control over the Rafah 
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Crossing. This control, in light of Israel‘s full control of all the other 
land passages, and the only other pedestrian crossing (Erez), further 
substantiate the view that its control over Gaza's pedestrian land 
crossings rises to the level of overall effective control. 
The Movement of Goods 
After the Blockade 
Israel‘s blockade of the Gaza Strip, instituted in June 2007, 
imposed a variety of severe restrictions on the passage of cargo 
through Gaza‘s terminals. A joint report published by Amnesty 
International UK, Oxfam, CARE International UK, Christian Aid, the 
Catholic Agency For Overseas Development (CAFOD), Medecins de 
Monde UK, Save the Children UK and Trocaire cataloged the 
movement of goods in and out of the Gaza Strip during the post-
blockade period. 208 Regarding the passage of cargo carrying 
humanitarian supplies, the report notes that: 
―The present definition of what constitutes essential 
humanitarian supplies into Gaza is seriously deficient. 
Humanitarian agencies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
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(OPT) have compiled a list of specific humanitarian goods which 
are essential for the survival and sustainability of life for the 
majority of the population, especially the most vulnerable 
groups such as children, the sick and the elderly. Unfortunately 
the Government of Israel has not allowed these items to 
enter.‖209 
OCHA oPt has similarly criticized Israel‘s restrictive definition 
of humanitarian supplies during this period, noting that: 
―In general, only limited types of goods classified by the Israeli 
authorities as ‗basic humanitarian products‘ (primarily food, 
fodder and hygiene items) were allowed into Gaza in the first 
two years of the blockade [June 2007 – June 2009].‖ 210 
This constriction on cargo occurred during this period in spite of 
the statements of the Israeli government following the arrangement of 
the AMA. Following the agreement, Israel made statements that the 
Karni crossing, ―the commercial lifeline into the Gaza Strip,‖ 211 would 
be fully functional by the end of 2006 and that 400 export trucks could 
cross each day. 212 Yet, in the months preceding the 2007 blockade, 
―only around 250 trucks a day entered Gaza through the Karni 
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crossing with supplies,‖ 213 and by March of 2007, ―crossings like 
Kerem Shalom [were] only able to deal with a maximum of 45 trucks a 
day. In most cases, this number [was] barely reached.‖ 214 
Israel has also imposed a blockade on exports traveling outside 
the Gaza Strip. Oxfam notes that in the post-blockade period, shortly 
preceding Operation Cast Lead: 
―In June 2007, there were 748 truckloads of exports leaving 
Gaza for Israel and other countries. A month later there were 
none. In December 2007, after much international pressure, 
reduced [restrictions on the] quantities of strawberries and 
carnations were allowed out, but not enough to safeguard the 
livelihoods of Palestinian farmers.‖ 215 
Oxfam further notes that: 
―[During March 2008], 95 percent of Gaza‘s industrial operations 
[were] suspended because they cannot access inputs for 
production nor can they export what they produce.‖ 216 
The passage of fuel and electricity supplies was also subject to 
severe restrictions during the post-blockade period. According to 
Oxfam, in the months preceding Operation Cast Lead: 
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―Gaza‘s main power plant [operated] on industrial diesel that 
[was] provided by the European Union as international aid to 
the Palestinian people. Yet the Israeli government prevent[ed] 
the EU from supplying any more than 2.2 million liters of oil a 
week, which [was] not sufficient for the power plant to operate 
at full capacity.‖ 217 
This has, in turn, had devastating effects on the ability of Gaza‘s 
power plant to export electricity. Oxfam notes that in the period 
preceding Operation Cast Lead: 
―Since Israel destroyed the original transformers in June 2006, 
the plant‘s export capacity has been reduced by almost two-
thirds. Today Gaza‘s power plant has the capacity to provide 80 
mW of electricity but actually only generates 55-65mW due to 
the Israeli restriction on industrial fuel supplies.‖ 
After June 2010 
The June 2010 initiative which oversaw the supposed 
―streamlining‖ of Israel‘s permit policy for the entry of pedestrians into 
and out of Gaza also included a series of measures intended to ease the 
cargo access restrictions Israel imposed in their June 2007 blockade. 
218 These relaxations were intended, in the words of Israel‘s Ministry of 
Defense, "to provide relief to the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, 
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while preventing the entry of weapons and other materials that can be 
used to harm the citizens of Israel." 219 
The announcement of these measures fell on the heels of a 
gradual expansion of cargo permitted to be imported into the Gaza 
Strip, beginning in late 2009. 220 Beginning in late 2009, Israel began 
to allow a few additional types of cargo (including glass, wood and 
clothing) to enter the Gaza Strip through the crossings in limited 
quantities. 221 The relaxation of cargo restrictions in June 2010 further 
saw the partial lifting on import restrictions, resulting in an increased 
availability of consumer goods and some raw materials within the 
Gaza Strip. 222  
With that said, in February of 2011, OCHA oPt conducted an 
assessment of the measures, involving 80 interview with relevant 
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stakeholders and extensive field observations. 223 Their published 
findings conclude that pivotal restrictions, in fact, remained in place. 
224 Notably, restrictions on the import of building materials (cement, 
gravel, steel bars, concrete blocks and asphalt, among others) were 
maintained. 225 These items‘ importation remains prohibited as ―dual-
use‖ materials, despite the fact that neither Israeli legislation nor by 
any international standard recognize them as such. 226 
Additionally, OCHA oPT notes that a multi-layered system of 
Israeli approvals regulating the import of every individual 
consignment of cargo materials has remained in place: 
―The import of industrial equipment and machinery has 
remained subject to multiple clearance requirements by the 
Israeli authorities, including for items not defined as ‗dual-use‘. 
These requirements have resulted in prolonged delays, 
unpredictability and higher costs, which became a discouraging 
factor for businesses in all sectors.‖ 227 
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Additionally, key restrictions on the export of goods have 
continued. 228 This is despite the plan‘s clear stipulation that export 
restrictions would be relaxed for furniture and textile products, 
however, this relaxation measure has yet to be implemented. 229 
Gaza‘s Airspace and Territorial Waters 
The implementation of the Disengagement Plan in 2005 did 
nothing to alter Israel‘s complete control over Gaza‘s airspace and 
territorial waters, which Israel has maintained sole control of ever 
since 1967. 230 In fact, the government of Israel expressly reserved its 
exclusive control of Gaza‘s airspace and territorial waters in the terms 
of the Plan.231 
Gaza‘s Airspace 
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Ever since the implementation of the Plan, Gaza‘s airspace has 
continued to be used for Israeli military operations. Notably, for Israeli 
combat and intelligence-gathering aircraft to patrol daily flights over 
the Gaza Strip. 232 Through this means, Israel monitors the actions on 
the ground in Gaza and may attack targets whenever it desires. 233 
Indeed, under the terms of the 2005 Disengagement Plan, Israel 
specifically reserves the right to use force against Palestinians inside 
Gaza in terms of preventative and reactive self-defense. 234  Israeli 
warplanes and drones have regularly patrolled the skies of Gaza since 
the implementation of the Plan, monitoring activity on the ground and 
sometimes firing missiles intended to assassinate militants, but which 
often kill civilians as well. 235 
Gaza‘s Airport 
The Oslo Accords formalized Israel‘s full control over Gaza‘s 
airspace, while also establishing that the Palestinian Authority could 
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build an airport in the area. 236 After Gaza Airport was built and 
opened in 1998, it provided a limited number of weekly flights to 
neighboring Arab countries. 237 Passengers leaving from the airport 
were transported by bus to the Rafah crossing, where they underwent 
Israeli security checks in the same manner as those leaving for Egypt 
through Rafah by land would, before being taken back to the airport. 
238 
Ever since October 8, 2000, however, Gaza‘s airport has been 
closed by Israel, and has not opened since. 239 Additionally, the Israeli 
Air Force bombed the airport‘s runways in December of 2001. 240 From 
the period of September 2000 through the implementation of the 
Disengagement Plan in 2005, the airport was used as an Israeli 
military base. 241 When the soldiers departed the airport during the 
Disengagement, it was widely reported that soldiers at the base had 
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vandalized and destroyed the infrastructure. 242 After the arrival of the 
AMA in November 2005, Israel recognized the airport‘s importance, 
and made a commitment to discuss arrangements to reopen it with the 
Palestinians. 243 However, no discussions on this matter have ever 
been held to this day and the airport remains closed. 244 
Due to Israel‘s exclusive control of Gaza‘s airspace, the 
Palestinian Authority cannot, on its own initiative, operate an airport. 
The situation infringes on the right to freedom of movement to and 
from Gaza and impairs the ability of Gazans to engage in foreign trade. 
Gaza‘s Territorial Waters 
Israel also retains control of Gaza‘s territorial waters. Israeli 
naval vessels regularly patrol Gaza's coast, interdicting sea vessels 
attempting to land and confiscating contraband such as weapons or 
narcotics. 245 While there is no fence along Gaza‘s coastline, residents 
still do not have open access to the sea.  246 Palestinians seeking access 
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to the sea are required to obtain a permit from Israel, and those who 
successfully obtain a permit are restricted in the distance they can 
travel from the shore. 247 Israeli patrol boats have, at various times, 
fired at boats that exceeded this distance. 248 
Just as with Israel‘s control of Gaza‘s airspace, the control of its 
sea space began with the occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967, and has 
gradually solidified since through the Oslo Accords and 
implementation of the Disengagement Plan. The terms of the Oslo 
Accords allow for Gaza‘s fishing boats to travel twenty nautical miles 
(roughly thirty-seven kilometers) from the coastline, except for a few 
areas to which they were prohibited entry. 249 In practice, however, 
Israel did not issue permits to all applicants, and allowed fishing up to 
a distance of no more than twelve nautical miles. 250 Following the 
2005 Disengagement plan, Israel reduced the fishing area even further 
and moreover, ever since the abduction of the soldier Gilad Shilat on 
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June 25, 2006, Gaza‘s fishermen have not been allowed to travel 
further than three nautical miles from the Gaza‘s coast. 251 
Gaza‘s Seaport 
The story of Gaza‘s seaport follows a similar narrative as Gaza‘s 
airport. The agreements signed by the parties since the beginning of 
the Oslo peace process clearly indicate both sides agreed to work 
toward building and operating a seaport in Gaza. 252 However, Israel 
bombed the seaport construction site in October of 2000 after 
infrastructure work for the port began earlier that year. 253 
Consequently, donor states have cut off funding for the project, and no 
work has been done on the seaport ever since. 254 
The terms of the AMA of November 2005 indicate that Israel 
agrees to allow renewal of construction work on the seaport. 255 
Additionally, in order to assure foreign donors, Israel promised it 
would not attack the port again and would cooperate in establishing 
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the security and other arrangements needed to operate it. However, no 
action has been taken in this matter to date. 256 
Access Restrictions and ―No-Go‖ Zones  
 The Israeli military enforces the access restrictions to ―restricted 
areas‖ within the Gaza Strip. 257 These restricted areas include ―no-go‖ 
areas and ―buffer zones‖ within the territory of the Gaza Strip, in areas 
near the border where Israeli settlements were formerly located. 258  
This is regularly done by means of firing ―warning shots‖ at people 
entering the restricted areas, which frequently has resulted in civilian 
casualties. 259 OCHA oPt estimates that ―restricted‖ land zones 
encompass 17 percent of the total land mass of the Gaza Strip, and at 
least 35 percent of its agricultural land. 260 
Sonics Booms 
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According to Israeli human rights group B‘tselem, Israeli air 
force jets have created sonic booms a number of times since the 
implementation of the Disengagement Plan. 261 A sonic boom is the 
high-volume, deep-frequency effect of low-flying jets traveling faster 
than the speed of sound. The Israeli government has used their air 
force jets to penetrate the sound barrier at low altitudes above Gaza‘s 
airspace, sending deafening shockwaves across the territory. 262 
The Israeli Air Force's low-altitude raids over the Gaza Strip 
were often conducted at night while Gazans slept in their beds. 263 
They were described by residents as like ―being hit by a wall of air‖ 
that is literally ―painful on the ears, sometimes causing nosebleeds and 
‗leaving you shaking inside.‖ 264 This new mode of power has been 
described as a form of psychoactive trauma that produces powerful 
physiological and psychological effects. According to Steve Goodman, it 
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―creates a climate of fear through a threat that was... as unsettling as 
an actual attack.  Indeed, the "undecidability between an actual or 
sonic attack is a virtualized fear... And yet the sonically induced fear is 
no less real. Such deployments do not necessarily attempt to deter 
enemy action, to ward off an undesirable future, but are as likely to 
prove provocative, to increase the likelihood of conflict, to precipitate 
that future." 265 
Military Incursions 
 Between the period of the Disengagement Plan and Operation 
Cast, Israel has launched several large-scale military incursions 
involving ground troops into the Gaza Strip. For example, in June 
2006, Israel invaded Gaza in a military campaign codenamed 
Operation Summer Rain. 266 During this invasion, at least 202 
Palestinians, including 42 children, were killed in the three-month 
operation which included 247 aerial bombings. 267 According to the UN, 
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Israel destroyed 120 structures, including homes and shops, and 
damaged an additional 160 structures. 268 
The Administration of Justice in Gaza 
 Although the implementation of the Disengagement Plan lead to 
the repeal of the system of Israeli military orders applicable to Gaza, 
and, accordingly, the jurisdiction of Israeli military courts therein, 
―this has not resulted in full authority over matters relating to the 
administration of justice being transferred by Israel to the 
Palestinians.‖ 269 In 2006, Israel enacted the Criminal Procedure Law, 
270 allowing it to incarcerate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip in 
detention facilities inside Israel, and prosecute them in Israeli civil 
courts. 271 Originally, the scope of the bill was limited solely to non-
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residents of the State of Israel,272 however, this statute was later 
amended. 273  
 In spite of the bill‘s later amendment, many observers have 
noted the original bill‘s (enacted in the wake of the Disengagement 
Plan) inclusion of the statute was ―born from a desire to retain direct 
control over aspects of the administration of justice in Gaza.‖ 274 
Indeed, in practice, the revised version of the bill has nearly 
exclusively been applied against Gaza residents. 275 According to the 
Knesset‘s estimates concerning the law, ―over 90% of detainees (to 
which this law was applied) were from the Gaza Strip.‖ 276 
 Additionally, one must make note of the Internment and 
Unlawful Combatant Law, 277 originally conceived in 2002 to legalize 
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the detention of Lebanese nationals as ―bargaining chips‖ for the 
exchange of Israeli prisoners of war and bodies. 278 Since the very day 
Israel completed its implementation of the Disengagement Plan, on 
September 12, 2005, the Israeli military authorities have issued 
detention orders under this law against Gaza residents. 279 Israel has 
continued the practice of using this law to detain Palestinians in the 
Gaza Strip without trial. 280 According to Adalah, a non-profit 
organization advocating the rights of the Palestinian minority inside 
Israel, at least 751 Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip were 
incarcerated in Israel as of July 2009 through the law. 281 
Palestinian Population Registry 
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During the period of Operation Cast Lead, and indeed presently, 
Israel has exercised control of Gaza‘s population registry. 282 Control of 
Gaza‘s population registry gives Israel the authority to determine legal 
residency in Gaza, thus allowing the Israeli military power to prevent 
the entrance into the Strip of Palestinians it chooses not to register. 283 
For that reason, even during the erratic periods when the Rafah 
crossing was open following the implementation of the Disengagement 
Plan and Operation Cast Lead, only holders of Palestinian identity 
cards were able to enter Gaza through the crossing. Accordingly, 
Israel‘s control over the Palestinian Population Registry also means 
control over who may enter and leave Gaza. 284  
While the terms of the Oslo Accords call for the transfer to the 
Palestinian Authority of ―the power to keep and administer registers 
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and records of the population,‖ 285 this power was limited to printing 
changes in the Palestinian Population Registry that Israel had already 
approved.  286 According to the UN Human Rights Council, during the 
period between 2000 and Operation Cast Lead, Israel has not 
permitted additions to the Palestinian Population Registry, with very 
few exceptions. 287 
Palestinian Taxation System 
Since 1994, Israel has continued to control the tax system in the 
Gaza Strip. 288 Under the Paris Agreement between Israel and the 
PLO, Israel is responsible for setting the value-added taxes (VAT) and 
custom rates on goods intended for consumption in the Gaza Strip. 289 
The VAT and custom duties imposed on imports are collected by Israel 
on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and transferred to the 
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Palestinian Authority each month. 290 This ability enables Israel to 
punish the Palestinian Authority by withholding the transfer of tax 
revenues collected on its behalf, a practice which Israel has exercised 
repeatedly according to Israeli Human Rights group B‘tselem. 291 
In addition, Israel controls the granting of exemptions from 
customs and VAT to non-profit organizations operating in the Gaza 
Strip who work toward vital humanitarian activities. 292 The 
significance of this power is difficult to understate. If a non-profit 
organization is not granted tax exemption, their ability to receive tax-
exempt donations of equipment and materials is severely inhibited. 
293As Israel has the final say on such approval, non-profit 
organizations in Gaza engaging in vital humanitarian activities would 
be forced to pay taxes as high as 100% in order to receive equipment 
donated from abroad. 294 
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Israel‘s full control over Gaza‘s ―customs envelope,‖ its collection 
of duties and VAT (based on Israel‘s rates) on behalf of the Palestinian 
Authority, and control over tax exemption status give it substantial 
power over economic and fiscal policy in Gaza. 295 
Interference with the Exercise of the Occupied Governmental 
Authority 
The Palestinian Authority‘s Finances and Ability to Provide Services 
to its Residents 
 In the wake of the Disengagement Plan‘s implementation, Israel 
claimed that it had unilaterally transferred control of services in the 
Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority. 296 However, this discards the 
number of ways Israel had, and continues to, exert control over the 
Palestinian Authority‘s ability to provide services to the Gaza Strip. 
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 It is widely documented that the tax revenues Israel collects on 
behalf of the Palestinian Authority constitute a significant proportion 
of the Palestinian Authority‘s operating income. 297 In the fiscal year of 
2005, for example, these tax revenues amounted to 50 percent of the 
Palestinian Authority‘s operating income. 298 During the post-
Disengagement period, the Palestinian Authority required $165 
million a month to operate, sixty percent of which was required to pay 
its employees‘ salaries. 299 When Israel withholds the transfer of these 
tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority, as it did in 2006 following 
the Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, 300 
it has critical effects on the Palestinian Authority‘s ability to provide 
services to its residents and pay its employees. 
The nonpayment of tax revenues in 2006 affected the 
Palestinian Authority‘s estimated 172,000 civil servants in Gaza and 
the West Bank, and the estimated one million residents who are 
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dependent on these salaries for their basic needs. 301 Accordingly, the 
number of Palestinian teachers and healthcare workers throughout 
Gaza has periodically struck, resulting in the shutting down of schools, 
municipal services and government offices in protest of the 
nonpayment of their salaries, beginning in September of 2006. 302 
Thus, control over the Palestinian Authority‘s tax revenues 
directly effects the provision of civilian services such as healthcare and 
education. While responsibility for these was formally transferred to 
the Palestinian Authority through the Disengagement Plan, Israel‘s 
continued withholding of tax revenues prevents the Palestinian 
Authority from exercise that responsibility. 303 
The Palestinian Authority‘s Ability to Engage in International 
Relations 
The Palestinian Authority is also inhibited in its ability to 
conduct foreign relations, both by international agreement, 304 and by 
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virtue of Israel‘s control of the means necessary to conduct those 
relations. For instance, the necessary functions of traveling abroad or 
entering into and enforcing commercial and other agreements. 305 
Overview 
Despite Israel‘s evacuation of its permanent ground troops out of 
the Gaza Strip, Israel continues to control significant aspects of life in 
the Gaza Strip. This is especially true in regards to the border 
crossings of the Gaza Strip, which Israel maintains an exceptionally 
high level of control over. 306 With very few exceptions, the movement 
of people out of Gaza through the Erez crossing, the only pedestrian 
terminal on the Gaza-Israeli border, is prohibited. 307 Only those who 
meet the government of Israel‘s criteria for an exceptional permit are 
allowed passage, a process which is time consuming, arduous and 
uncertain. 308 Additionally, permit applications submitted by Gaza 
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residents who meet the established criteria are subject to arbitrary 
denial. 309 
 The only other crossing allowing Gaza residents access to the 
outside world, the Rafah crossing, is located on the Gaza-Egypt border. 
While the terms an agreement reached following the Disengagement 
Plan call for the Palestinian Authority to operate this crossing, Israel 
continues to exercise significant residual control over Rafah. 310 Israel‘s 
consent is required for Rafah Crossing to operate at all, because the 
agreement for opening the crossing requires the participation of Israeli 
officials. 311 Additionally, with very few exceptions, entry into Gaza 
through the Rafah crossing is limited to those registered under the 
Palestinian population registry, 312 a registry which Israel controls. 313 
Moreover, Israel reserves the right to block the entrance of any 
Palestinian residents whom Israel considers to be ―terrorist activists.‖ 
                                                          
309 Ibid, at pp. 30 
 
310 Supra ―The Rafah Crossing,‖ at pp. 70 
 
311 Ibid 172, at pp. 12 
 
312 Supra ―The Rafah Crossing,‖ at pp. 70 
 
313 Supra ―Israel‘s Control of the Palestinian Population Registry,‖ at 
pp. 40 
 
 102  
 
314 Accordingly, the opening of crossing to persons through Rafah has 
been resoundingly described as sporadic, ad hoc, and erratic,315 
opening between one and two or three days per month. 316  
 Israel also maintains considerable control over the passage of 
goods through Gaza‘s border crossings. For example, Israel continues 
to restrict the import of building materials (cement, gravel, steel bars, 
concrete blocks and asphalt, among others). 317 These items‘ 
importation remains prohibited as ―dual-use‖ materials, despite the 
fact that neither Israeli legislation nor any international standard 
recognize them as such. 318 Humanitarian supplies are not safe from 
Israeli restrictions, either, as Israel continues to only allow an 
extremely limited category of ―basic humanitarian products‖ (primarily 
food, fodder and hygiene items) to enter into Gaza during the post-
Disengagement period. 319 Additionally, a multi-layered system of 
Israeli approvals regulating the import of every individual 
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consignment of cargo materials has remained in place for items not 
defined as ―dual-use.‖ 320  These multiple clearance requirements have 
resulted in prolonged delays, unpredictability and higher costs for 
Gaza‘s businesses in all sectors. 321 
Israel also heavily restricts the quantity of cargo allowed to be 
imported into Gaza. In the period following the Disengagement Plan, 
only around 250 trucks a day entered Gaza through the Karni crossing, 
the lifeblood of the Gaza Strip, with supplies. 322 By March of 2007, 
other cargo crossings like Kerem Shalom were only able to deal with a 
maximum of 45 trucks a day for a population of 1.5 million residents. 
323 In most cases, this number was barely reached. 324 Additionally, 
Israel has continued to impose a blockade on exports traveling outside 
the Gaza Strip. For instance, in July of 2007, literally no truckloads of 
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exports left Gaza for Israel and other countries due to Israeli 
suspensions. 325  
The implementation of the Disengagement Plan in 2005 did 
nothing to alter Israel‘s complete control over Gaza‘s airspace and 
territorial waters, which Israel has maintained sole control of ever 
since 1967. 326 Gaza‘s airspace has continued to be used for Israeli 
military operations. 327 Notably, for Israeli combat and intelligence-
gathering aircraft to patrol daily flights over the Gaza Strip. Through 
this means, Israel monitors the actions on the ground in Gaza and may 
attack targets whenever it desires (a practice Israel has not hesitated 
to exercise). 328 Israeli warplanes and drones have regularly used 
Gaza‘s airspace since the implementation of the Plan to fire missiles 
intended to assassinate militants, but which often kill civilians as well. 
329 Additionally, it has been widely reported that Israel has also used 
Gaza‘s airspace to conduct mock attacks through its warplanes by 
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making so-called sonic booms a number of times since the 
implementation of the Disengagement Plan. 330 
Additionally, Israel retains control of Gaza‘s territorial waters. 
And Israeli naval vessels regularly patrol Gaza's coast, interdicting sea 
vessels attempting to land and confiscating contraband such as 
weapons or narcotics. 331 Israel continues to restrict Gaza‘s residents 
access to the sea, requiring them to first obtain permits, and then 
restricting those who do obtain permits in the distance they can travel 
from the shore. 332 Ever since June 25, 2006, Gaza‘s fishermen have 
not been allowed to travel further than three nautical miles from the 
Gaza‘s coast, and have sometimes been shot at for doing so. 333 
The Israeli military also continues to enforce access to 
―restricted areas‖ within the territory of the Gaza Strip. 334 These 
restricted areas include ―no-go‖ areas and ―buffer zones‖ within the 
territory of the Gaza Strip, in areas near the border where Israeli 
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settlements were formerly located. 335  The enforcement of these zones 
is regularly done by means of firing ―warning shots‖ at people entering 
the restricted areas, which frequently has resulted in civilian 
casualties. 336 The United Nations estimates that ―restricted‖ land 
zones encompass 17 percent of the total land mass of the Gaza Strip, 
and at least 35 percent of its agricultural land. 337 
It is also true that Israel has launched several large-scale 
military incursions involving ground troops into the Gaza Strip after 
the implementation of the Disengagement Plan. 338 For example, in 
June 2006, Israel invaded Gaza in a military campaign codenamed 
Operation Summer Rain. 339 During this invasion, at least 202 
Palestinians, including 42 children, were killed in the three-month 
operation which included 247 aerial bombings. 340 According to the UN, 
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Israel destroyed 120 structures, including homes and shops, and 
damaged an additional 160 structures. 341 
Additionally, although the implementation of the 
Disengagement Plan lead to the repeal of the system of Israeli military 
orders applicable to Gaza, and, accordingly, the jurisdiction of Israeli 
military courts therein, Israel continues to exercise authority over 
matters relating to the administration of justice in Gaza. 342 This has 
been done through Israel enacting of the Criminal Procedure Law in 
2006, 343 allowing it to incarcerate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip in 
detention facilities inside Israel, and prosecute them in Israeli civil 
courts. 344  
Israel has also exercised control in this area through the 
Internment and Unlawful Combatant Law, originally conceived in 
2002 to legalize the detention of Lebanese nationals as ―bargaining 
chips‖ for the exchange of Israeli prisoners of war and bodies. 345 Since 
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the very day Israel completed its implementation of the 
Disengagement Plan, on September 12, 2005, the Israeli military 
authorities have issued detention orders under this law against Gaza 
residents. 346 Israel has continued the practice of using this law to 
detain Palestinians in the Gaza Strip without trial.   At least 751 
Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip were incarcerated in Israel as 
of July 2009 through the law. 347 
As mentioned before, Israel‘s continues to maintain control over 
the Palestinian Population Registry. Control of Gaza‘s population 
registry gives Israel the authority to determine legal residency in 
Gaza, thus allowing the Israeli military power to prevent the entrance 
into the Gaza Strip of Palestinians  it chooses not to register. 348 
According to the UN Human Rights Council, during the period 
between 2000 and Operation Cast Lead, Israel has not permitted 
additions to the Palestinian Population Registry, with very few 
exceptions. 349 
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Since 1994, Israel has continued to control the tax system in the 
Gaza Strip through setting the value-added taxes (VAT) and custom 
rates on goods intended for consumption in the Gaza Strip. 350 The 
VAT and custom duties imposed on imports are collected by Israel on 
behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and transferred to the Palestinian 
Authority each month. 351 This ability enables Israel to punish the 
Palestinian Authority by withholding the transfer of tax revenues 
collected on its behalf, a practice which Israel has exercised repeatedly. 
352 In addition, Israel controls the granting of exemptions from customs 
and VAT to non-profit organizations operating in the Gaza Strip who 
work toward vital humanitarian activities. 353 Accordingly, if a non-
profit organization is not granted tax exemption, their ability to receive 
tax-exempt donations of equipment and materials is severely inhibited.  
354 
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Finally, Israel continues to impede the Palestinian Authority‘s 
ability to provide services to its residents. 355 This is due to the fact 
that the Palestinian Authority relies on tax revenues, which Israel 
collects on its behalf, for their operating income. 356 Accordingly, when 
Israel withholds the transfer of these tax revenues to the Palestinian 
Authority, as it did in 2006 following the Hamas victory in the 
Palestinian Legislative Council elections, it has critical effects on the 
Palestinian Authority‘s ability to provide services to its residents, 
including the provision of civilian services such as healthcare and 
education. 357  
Conclusion 
Was the Gaza Strip Occupied Territory Operation Cast Lead? 
It was established in earlier sections of this paper that Israel 
satisfied the criteria for occupation with regard to the Gaza Strip up to 
2005. 358 Additionally, it has been demonstrated that both the Hague 
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention are de jure applicable 
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to the situation in the Gaza Strip for this period. 359 The remaining 
question, then, relates to whether Israel still retained effective control 
in the meaning of these instruments subsequent to the changed factual 
situation created by the Disengagement Plan. 
Occupation, within the meaning of the Hague Regulations, 
exists when and where the authority of the Occupying Power has been 
established and can be exercised, a test that is often referred to as 
effective control. Regarding this matter, it is important to note that 
military presence is not, in itself, a necessary condition for the 
persistence of occupation. 360 One is reminded of the words of the ICTY, 
stating that occupation exists when an Occupying Power has ―a 
sufficient force present, or the capacity to send troops within a 
reasonable time to make the authority of the Occupying Power felt.‖ 361 
In the context of Gaza, the question is not one ―of creating an 
occupation, which as a practical matter would appear to require the 
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use of ground forces to create and maintain control, but rather whether 
an existing occupation has been terminated or maintained.‖ 362 
Accordingly, the sections immediately preceding the present one 
sought assess whether Israel clung to enough military capability in 
and around Gaza to enforce its control following the 2005 
Disengagement. The findings leave little doubt that Israel has - and in 
fact continues to - exercise considerable control over the Gaza Strip. 
Yet, the question of whether this control suffices to rise to that of 
belligerent occupation lingers.  
Based on the findings in the previous sections of this paper, it is 
difficult to see how Israel‘s continued level of control over the 
government functions of the Gaza Strip - and sufficient means to 
enforce this effective control when necessary - fail to meet the criteria 
for triggering the laws of occupation in the Hague Regulations and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions.   When all the indicators are seen 
cumulatively – the limited control of the Palestinian Authority over 
key functions of government, its lack of control over international 
borders, sea and airspace, as well as the continued Israeli control of 
key security and welfare aspects of life in the Gaza Strip - the evidence 
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for effective control is overwhelming. Both of the essential elements of 
occupation (Israel‘s ability to exercise its authority, and the 
Palestinian Authority‘s inability to function publicly) are present in 
the Gaza Strip. In spite of Israel‘s disengagement, Israel continues to 
exercise powers that afford it the ultimate authority. 
One of the chief reasons cited by those who would argue that 
this control does not amount to belligerent occupation is the existence 
of a local government within Gaza. 363 However, this view discounts 
the de facto inhibition of the local government from exercising genuine 
sovereignty. Furthermore, as the Goldstone Report noted:  
―As shown in the case of Denmark during the Second World 
War, the occupier can leave in place an existing local 
administration or allow a new one to be installed for as long as it 
preserves for itself the ultimate authority.‖ 364 
While the Palestinian Authority assumes a series of functions 
within designated zones in the Gaza Strip, it does so on the basis of the 
terms of the Oslo Accord agreement, while Israel retains for itself 
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―powers and responsibilities not so transferred.‖ 365 Here, one is also 
reminded of the judgment of the Wall advisory opinion, which held 
that the limited transfer of powers and responsibilities by Israel under 
various agreements had ―done nothing‖ to change Israel‘s status as an 
Occupying Power vis-à-vis the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
The absence of any fixed Israeli military presence, government 
or administration in Gaza is another primary factor cited as evidence 
of a lack of Israeli effective control. 366 Indeed, the situation in Gaza 
following the Disengagement Plan poses a challenge to the traditional 
understanding of occupation in some ways, but conforms to the 
occupation-related international jurisprudence, which has clearly 
established criteria for the existence of occupation that does not insist 
on a fixed presence or formal administration. 367  
Legal Implications  
Reparations 
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The designation of Gaza as occupied territory in the post-
Disengagement Period is fundamental to the question of the legal 
framework applicable to the territory. If Gaza can be considered 
occupied, the extent of Israel‘s obligations under international law 
towards Gaza‘s inhabitants are apparent. It means that Israel ―is 
bound by the provisions of international humanitarian law, 
particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, which oblige the 
occupying power to provide for the humanitarian needs of the occupied 
people and to desist from collective punishment of the people in the 
name of self-defense.‖ 368 
As stated, the Fourth Geneva Conventions aim to protect the 
physical, economic and social needs of the civilian population. 369 This 
is apparent, for instance, in Article 50, which imposes the affirmative 
duty of an Occupying Power to facilitate the care and education of the 
children. 370 The same goes for the Occupying Power‘s obligation to 
ensure the food and medical supplies of the population in Article 55; 371 
the Occupying Power‘s obligation to maintain medical and hospital 
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services in Article 56; 372 and the Occupying Power must allow national 
Red Cross societies to carry out their activities under Article 63. 373 
The functions which these articles aim to ensure are a vital 
component of what functions should be under the effective control of an 
Occupying Power before an occupation exists under the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions. 374 As Israel negatively influences the physical, economic 
and social wellbeing of the Gaza Strip‘s population with its military 
actions, control over the border, imports export, the freedom of 
movement within Gaza, 375 Israel is bound by these responsibilities. 
With effective control, comes responsibility under the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions and the need for an Occupying Power to ensure these 
functions. 
To the extent that these international obligations were breached 
by Israel during Operation Cast Lead, the principle that a State should 
repair the damage or loss caused is supported by international 
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humanitarian law conventions. Article 91 of the Additional Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) notes that: 
―[A] Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be 
liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.‖ 376  
Additionally, Rules 149, 150 and 158 of the ICRC study on 
customary international law outline the customary rules for state 
responsibility. Rule 149 notes that: 
―[A] State is responsible for violations of international 
humanitarian law attributable to it, including: (a) violations 
committed by its organs, including its armed forces; (b) 
violations committed by persons or entities it empowered to 
exercise elements of governmental authority;(c) violations 
committed by persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, 
or under its direction or control; and (d) violations committed by 
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private persons or groups which it acknowledges and adopts as 
its own conduct.‖ 377 
Rule 150 provides that responsible states are required to make 
reparations for loss or injury caused. 378 Accordingly, Israel‘s 
obligations to Gaza include; ―(1) responsibility for actions taken by its 
officials and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF); (2) a duty to make 
reparations for any injury or loss caused to Gazans during Operation 
Cast Lead; and (3) a duty to investigate and prosecute any war crimes 
perpetrated by its officials and IDF officers both in Israel and, as the 
occupying power, in Gaza.‖ 379 
Regarding the second obligation, the Palestinian Authority has 
estimated the total cost of early recovery and reconstruction at US 
$1,326 million in March 2009. 380 The Goldstone Report reminds us 
that ―To this amount should be added the indirect costs of the impact 
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on human and animal health, the environment and market 
opportunities. These losses are still to be estimated.‖ 381 
Undermining the Claim of Self-Defense 
The designation of Gaza as occupied is also critical in any 
proceedings which might seek to enforce humanitarian law by 
addressing Israel‘s alleged war crimes through international criminal 
law. It can be argued that if Gaza can be considered occupied territory 
during Operation Cast Lead, that Israel may not be able to plead self-
defense as justification for the military campaign. Arguably, self-
defense cannot be invoked in relation to an attack that originates 
within territory a State occupies. 382  
The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use 
of Force in Self-Defense notes that ―an armed attack is an attack 
directed from outside the territory controlled by the state.‖383 
Furthermore, the ICJ‘s Wall advisory opinion notes that ―unless an 
attack is directed from outside territory under the control of the 
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defending State, the question of self-defense in the sense of Article 51 
[of the U.N. Charter] does not normally arise.‖ 384 
Limitations on the Use of Force 
While Gaza‘s designation as occupied may have consequences for 
Israel‘s right to invoke self-defender under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, Victor Kattan reminds us that: 
―Not all defensive measures are measures taken in self-defense 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is because self-defense 
is an exculpatory plea regarding resort to force in the first place, 
and not for an offense taken during an armed conflict.‖ 385 
In other words: 
"Israel is employing a jus ad bellum (justifications for going to 
war) principle in a jus ad bello (principles governing the conduct of 
war) context–citing a ground for initiating conflict for its behavior in 
what is, legally and in fact, a continuing conflict. This does not mean 
that Israel, in principle, cannot use force to suppress violence 
emanating from either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, or act to 
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protect its own civilian population. But as a matter of law, it must do 
this as an exercise of its right to police the occupied territories, and not 
as an exercise of the right of self-defense.‖ 386 
Accordingly, the designation of Gaza as occupied is relevant to 
the limitations of an Occupying Power‘s right to use force. If Gaza can 
be said to be occupied territory during Operation Cast Lead, Israel 
may be restricted by the laws of occupation in their right to use force in 
maintaining public order in the territory it occupies. Israel, in its 
conduct of Operation Cast Lead, arguably vastly surpassed the 
limitations of acceptable, legal force for an Occupying Power.  
The Crime of Aggression 
 Lastly, the status of the Gaza Strip may influence whether 
Israel‘s attack on the Gaza Strip constitutes the crime of aggression. 
Bisharat observes that ―there are only two exceptions to the general 
prohibition on the use of force in international affairs–military action 
taken with the approval of the UN Security Council and the use of 
force in self-defense.‖ 387 As the Security Council did not authorize 
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Operation Cast Lead, 388 and if Israel is not able to claim self-defense, 
―Israel‘s invasion of Gaza arguably amounts to aggression.‖ 389 
However, Bisharat notes that the determination of Gaza as occupied 
may not be positive for those seeking to allege Israel of it for Operation 
Cast Lead: 
―[T]he charge of aggression may be inapposite for two… reasons: 
first… Gaza is not a state, and it is not clear that aggression can 
be committed against a non-state entity; second, whether or not 
Gaza is a state… it remains under Israeli occupation, and 
arguably, alleging aggression–like Israel‘s claim to self-defense–
improperly imports jus ad bellum principles into a context of an 
ongoing conflict. In this view, aggression, in essence, involves 
the unjustified initiation of war by one state against another 
state, not its continuation.‖ 390 
Empowering the Occupant 
In addition to the affirmative duties imposed on the Occupying 
Power toward the civilian population, the Hague Regulations and 
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Fourth Geneva Convention also empowers an occupant to rights which 
may not always be positive for an occupied territory. For instance, the 
Hague Regulations‘ Article 43 permits the penal laws of an occupied 
territory to be ―repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power… 
where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the 
application of the present Convention.‖  391 Article 64 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention also states that: 
―The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of 
the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable 
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present 
Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, 
and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the 
members and property of the occupying forces or administration, 
and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication 
used by them.‖ 392 
 However, the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention 
clearly states that ―these varied measures must not under any 
circumstances serve as a means of oppressing the population.‖ 393 
Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reiterates that principle, 
noting that if ―the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for 
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imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning 
protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned 
residence or to internment.‖ 394 The impact of an Occupying Power‘s 
security measures on an occupied population are further minimized 
under Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that 
the civilian population ―shall not be deprived, in any case or in any 
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention.‖ 395 
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